Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs

Aimone, Jason A.; Iannaccone, Laurence R.; Makowsky, Michael D.; Rubin, Jared

doi:10.1093/restud/rdt017

Cited by 77 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 61 publications

(63 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However, this limit case again triggers similar dynamics towards the other group, leading to a cyclical pattern: There is permanent change in social structure with high types starting out to separate from the 4 lannaccone (1992) looks at a comparable mechanism to explain seemingly unproductive behavior in the context of religion and cults. Aimone et al (2013) also provide experimental evidence. However, in these papers, screening out low types provides an additional benefit to in-group members as it also affects the relative costs of carrying out the costly action.…”

mentioning

confidence: 85%

Social identity and social free-riding

Bernard

Hett

Mechtel

2016

European Economic Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe model individual identification choice as a strategic group formation problem.When choosing a social group to identify with, individuals appreciate high social status and a group stereotype to which they have a small social distance. A group's social status and stereotype are shaped by the (exogenous) individual attributes of its members and hence endogenous to individuals' choices. Unless disutility from social distance is strong enough, this creates a strategic tension as individuals with attributes that contribute little to group status would like to join high-status groups, thereby diluting the latters' status and changing stereotypes. Such social free-riding motivates the use of soft exclusion technologies in high-status groups, which provides a unifying rationale for phenomena such as hazing rituals, charitable activities or status symbols that is not taste-based or follows a standard signaling mechanism.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 85%

Social identity and social free-riding

Bernard

Hett

Mechtel

2016

European Economic Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…5 Precise answers on the questions we address are di¢ cult to extract from these data for a number of reasons. First, each international con ‡ict has a number of idiosyncratic aspects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Group Formation in Experimental Contests

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We …nd that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending e¤ort above average choose to stand alone. If these players are forced to play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower e¤ort. Anticipation of this exploitation may explain their preference to stand alone.JEL codes: D72, D74

show abstract

“…Page et al (2005) showed that the endogenous group formation is helpful in sustaining cooperation, compared with the control treatment without such endogenous 14 Also see Aimone et al (2013).…”

Section: Hypothesis 3(e): the Percentage Of Subjects That Sort Into Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Disclosure and Cooperation in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Kamei

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A large volume of theoretical and experimental studies have suggested that making information on people's past behaviors visible to others may lead to the evolution of cooperation in finitely-repeated environments. But, do people endogenously cooperate with randomlymatched peers by revealing their past when they have an option to hide it? This paper experimentally shows that cooperation does not evolve in a random-matching environment because a large fraction of people do not choose to reveal their past behavior. However, when a costly sorting mechanism (where disclosers are matched with other disclosers; and likewise nondisclosers with other non-disclosers) is present, a stable number of subjects decide to costly disclose their past to join the reputation community and cooperate with other disclosers. Our study at the same time shows that when the sorting process is free, the high efficiency in the reputation community decreases as strategic subjects tend to join the reputation community and attempt to exploit cooperators. These findings suggest an important role of costly sorting mechanisms in the formation of communities (including online platforms) in order for people to sustain a high level of cooperation norms.

show abstract

Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs

Cited by 77 publications

References 61 publications

Social identity and social free-riding

Social identity and social free-riding

Endogenous Group Formation in Experimental Contests

Information Disclosure and Cooperation in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About