“…The work initiated by T. Negishi in [8], though interesting, either required the imposition of very strong assumptions, or gave highly complex, intractable and inapplicable models: in the Negishi's approach, traders were allowed to have subjective perceptions of the price impact, which implied a great deal of arbitrariness on the determination of equilibria, unless the subjective conjectures where exogenously restricted; later attempts to impose more structure to the definition of equilibrium endowed the model with explicit strategic games, which came at the cost of tractability. 2 In this paper, we apply a model of economic equilibrium, based on [12], in which all individual traders recognize the impact that their trades have on financial prices, and in which these effects are determined endogenously as part of the equilibrium concept. 3 This model maintains the flexible, tractable and spare structure of the competitive model, but the departure from the competitive premise implies that none of the standard positive or normative results are immediately applicable, and, in particular, the necessity of a noarbitrage condition, and the derivation of an objective probability have to be argued.…”