Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange

Balbuzanov, Ivan; Kotowski, Maciej H.

doi:10.3982/ecta15676

Cited by 18 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…The allocations µ in Example 9 and Example 10 can be found by BK's mechanism, but they cannot be found by YRMH-IGYT and are induction blocked. Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019b) build the right to exclude into a production network in which agents and firms interact through input-output relations. It seems that the conventional interpretation of property rights we follow cannot be similarly extended.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a general allocation model, Sönmez (1999) relates the existence of desirable mechanisms to singlevaluedness of the core. Observing the contrast between the simplicity of endowments in economic models and the complexity of property in practice, Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019a) (BK hereafter) present a discrete exchange economy with possibly redundant and joint ownership. An agent may own more than one objects though he is unit-demand, and multiple agents may co-own an object.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coalition and Core in Resource Allocation and Exchange

Zhang

2020

SSRN Journal

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In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, the conventional strong core may be empty, while the weak core may include unintuitive outcomes. We propose new core notions in the conventional flavor by regarding endowments as rights to consume or trade with others. Our key idea is to identify self-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property rights. Our first notion lies between the strong core and the weak core and is independent of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's (2019a) exclusion core. Our second notion refines the first and the exclusion core by combining their different merits. We generalize the You Request My House -I Get Your Turn mechanism to find our core allocations.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition and Core in Resource Allocation and Exchange

Zhang

2020

SSRN Journal

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“…Since this result is obtained by constructing a finite rights structure, this characterization result encompasses implementation in core as well as in generalized stable sets (van Deemen, 1991;Page and Wooders, 2009). Moreover, for marriage problems (Knuth, 1976) and for a class of exchange economy with property rights (Balbuzanov and Kotowski, 2019), we show that the set of stable outcomes is implementable in MSS, and thus exhibits a convergence property, which is particularly important in our design framework. However, implementation in MSS cannot guarantees always the order of rotation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 86%

An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

Submitter¹,

Korpela²,

Lombardi

et al. 2021

SSRN Journal

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Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pareto efficient social choice rules under complete information. The notion of the rotation program predicts the outcomes. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the implementation in rotation programs and show that, for multi-valued rules, our notion of rotation monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Finally, we identify two classes of assignment problems that are implementable in rotation programs.

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“…We differ not only in the use of cardinal utilities but also in the absence of preexisting endowments. Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) explore the role of endowments for discrete allocation problems. Different from us, they interpret endowments as the rights to exclude others, and propose a new cooperative game solution concept.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints

Echenique

Miralles

Zhang

2021

Journal of Economic Theory

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We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy, but this can be incompatible with reservation utilities. It is possible that Alice's envy of Bob's assignment cannot be remedied without violating Bob's participation constraint. Instead, we seek to rule out justified envy, defined as envy for which a remedy would not violate any agent's participation constraint. We show that fairness, meaning the absence of justified envy, can be achieved together with efficiency and individual rationality. We introduce a competitive equilibrium approach with price-dependent incomes obtaining the desired properties.

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Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange

Cited by 18 publications

References 47 publications

Coalition and Core in Resource Allocation and Exchange

Coalition and Core in Resource Allocation and Exchange

An Implementation Approach to Rotation Programs

Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints

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