2021
DOI: 10.1016/bs.hesind.2021.11.017
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Energy and environmental markets, industrial organization, and regulation

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…It is assumed that the rental assessment reflects an increase in the economic effect of the exploitation of a natural resource or a decrease in the effect (the occurrence of damage) that occur as a result of the refusal to use it (a decrease in its quality, productivity). The amount of differential rent depends on the marginal (closing) costs, which are understood as the reduced costs of obtaining an additional unit of production from the closing consumer, and the amount of individual costs for the production of this type of product [16][17][18][19].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is assumed that the rental assessment reflects an increase in the economic effect of the exploitation of a natural resource or a decrease in the effect (the occurrence of damage) that occur as a result of the refusal to use it (a decrease in its quality, productivity). The amount of differential rent depends on the marginal (closing) costs, which are understood as the reduced costs of obtaining an additional unit of production from the closing consumer, and the amount of individual costs for the production of this type of product [16][17][18][19].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…patterns are not being driven by externalities like common pool inefficiencies or information spillovers (see Kellogg and Reguant (2021) for a review of research on these topics). We examine this possibility further in Figure A.2 in Appendix B.2, where we show that there is a spike in drilling prior to primary term expiration regardless of whether the unit operator controls nearby units or not.…”
Section: Evidence On Primary Terms and Bunching Of Drillingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, in Section 7 we study how primary terms interact with royalties to affect the mineral owner's expected discounted revenue from a lease. We adopt a modeling framework in which firms have a hidden signal about productivity and owners can make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it contract offers, following the literature on oil and gas auctions (see Haile, Hendricks, and Porter (2010) and Kellogg and Reguant (2021) for reviews) and especially recent papers that study owner‐optimal royalties in auctions for state‐owned parcels (Bhattacharya, Ordin, and Roberts (2018), Ordin (2019), Kong, Perrigne, and Vuong (2022)). In these papers, a higher royalty rate trades off reductions in firms' information rents with decreases in firms' likelihood of drilling conditional on being awarded a lease, per theoretical arguments from Hendricks, Porter, and Tan (1993) and Skrzypacz (2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%