Energy Policy in America since 1945

Vietor, Richard H. K.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528057

Cited by 81 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…44 It is interesting to contrast this pattern with the distribution of the political support for regulation. As noted by Sanders (1981) and Vietor (1984) it is widely believed that support for natural gas regulation was most entrenched in the gas consuming states east of the Mississippi, while gas producers in the Southwest staunchly advocated deregulation. This belief is at least partially confirmed by voting records from 1973. and discounted the costs to customers without access to natural gas.…”

Section: The Geographical Distribution Of Allocative Costmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…In contrast, the microdata is already disaggregated and can be used to construct new demand a substantial increase in natural gas shortages beginning in the early 1970s is consistent with evidence of shortfalls in contractually-obligated deliveries to pipelines. According to Vietor (1984), these curtailments began in the early 1970s and reached 15% of the entire market for natural gas in 1976. 33 This timing is consistent with the pattern of physical shortages implied by the model.…”

Section: Physical Shortagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By all accounts natural gas producers were operating in a competitive market. In 1953, the 30 largest gas producers controlled less than half of all proved reserves, and accounted for only one third of sales to interstate pipelines (see Vietor 1984). In the same year, the largest four firms produced 17% of the national output and the largest 44 firms produced 73% (see Lindahl 1956).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Allocative Cost of Price Ceilings in the U.S. Residential Market for Natural Gas

Davis¹,

Kilian²

2011

Journal of Political Economy

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A direct consequence of restricting the price of a good for which secondary markets do not exist is that, in the presence of excess demand, the good will not be allocated to the buyers who value it the most. We demonstrate the empirical importance of this allocative cost for the U.S. residential market for natural gas, which was subject to price ceilings during 1954–89. Using a household-level, discrete-continuous model of natural gas demand, we estimate that the allocative cost in this market averaged $3.6 billion annually, nearly tripling previous estimates of the net welfare loss to U.S. consumers.

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Section: The Geographical Distribution Of Allocative Costmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Physical Shortagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Allocative Cost of Price Ceilings in the U.S. Residential Market for Natural Gas

Davis¹,

Kilian²

2011

Journal of Political Economy

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“…Prior to the early 1980s, Western European energy markets were dominated by a few state‐owned providers; energy prices were, by and large, set by state authorities, only vaguely oriented at actual costs; and market access and exchange were highly regulated in order to control prices. Even in the US, which traditionally embraced market principles with greater enthusiasm than the rest of the OECD, price controls prevailed for oil and oil products, while Washington’s policies proved as interventionist as the ones of Paris, Bonn or London in the event of crises, notably in the aftermath of the 1970s oil shocks (Kalt, 1981; Parra, 2004; Rycroft and Kash, 1984; Vietor, 1984). This approach to energy policy reflects a broader paradigm that informed economic policy making more generally at that time: namely statism .…”

Section: Paradigm Shifts Policy Agendas and Governance Patternsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From the State to the Market and Back: Policy Implications of Changing Energy Paradigms

Goldthau

2012

Global Policy

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Like almost no other sector, energy reflects changing paradigms. Following a statist approach in which energy services were subject to public provision and administered by state companies, the free market paradigm took over in the 1980s and 1990s, making energy subject to private provision instead. More recently, the world has witnessed a new era of interventionism. Assessing these different phases, this article advances three arguments. First, paradigms matter in energy as they provide for crucial policy prescriptions. Second, agendas have become more complex, adding sustainability and energy poverty to traditional supply security. Third, paradigms are inextricably linked to rule-setting power, putting the non-OECD world in charge of defining the next paradigm. With regards to the latter, it is argued that it will likely be one characterised by fragmentation, with elements of state and market coexisting. Policy Implications• Energy policy has shifted from a liberal market model to an interventionist one. Understanding the nature of this paradigm shift is essential for western policy makers and businesses to navigate effectively in this new energy environment. • Established OECD energy consumers are about to lose their rule-setting power in all three major energy arenassecurity, access and sustainability. • Energy priorities set in non-OECD, notably Asian, countries will determine policy pathways for rule takers. Incumbents need to embrace these shifts fully to formulate future policies effectively. • The market as dominant governance model in energy is increasingly contested. Businesses need to be prepared to adapt to fragmented environments between state dirigisme and market liberalism.

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“…We had suffered the first of the great energy crunches-more were to follow-and the 1973 event symbolized a larger shift in the international political economy as countries around the world took control of their own natural resources. 21 Our merchandise trade balance was negative during eight of the ten years following 1970, and imports of machinery tripled in the latter part of the decade. Between 1970 and 1980, exports of American automobiles increased from more than $3 billion to more than $13 billion.…”

Section: IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paying Up: The Price of the Vietnam War

Galambos¹

1996

J. Policy Hist.

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Robert S. McNamara recently raised a stir about America's involvement in the Vietnam War. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, his personal apology for his role as Secretary of Defense (1961–68) during the first phase of the war, shot to the top of the best-seller lists. But the author was surely more interested in uncovering some forgiveness, some sympathy for his plight, than he was in royalties. If so, he certainly must be disappointed. What McNamara uncovered beneath the surface of current events were several generations of Americans who still have powerful emotions about the war and still hate the leaders—McNamara included—who guided the nation into that debacle.

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Energy Policy in America since 1945

Cited by 81 publications

References 0 publications

The Allocative Cost of Price Ceilings in the U.S. Residential Market for Natural Gas

The Allocative Cost of Price Ceilings in the U.S. Residential Market for Natural Gas

From the State to the Market and Back: Policy Implications of Changing Energy Paradigms

Paying Up: The Price of the Vietnam War

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