Enforcement of nineteenth century banking contracts using a marriage rule

Nair, Malavika

doi:10.1016/j.qref.2011.08.001

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Anwar Harjono said that "the word marriage is the same as the word nikah or zawaj in fiqh terms" (Boedi & Hasan, 2011). According to the terminology of jurisprudence, marriage means a contract (agreement) that contains the ability to have sexual intercourse by using the word nikah or tazwij (Nair, 2011).…”

Section: Kontrak (Nikah Mut`ah) According To the Islamic Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Position of Contract Marriage Law (Nikah Mut`Ah) in Indonesia: A Comparative Study

Afrizal

2022

JRSSEM

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In the aspect of Islamic law, mut'ah marriage was allowed by Rasulullah SAW only during the war. But the permission has been abolished or the law of mut'ah marriage is forbidden and sinful for those who do it. In the aspect of national law, contract marriage is considered a legal defect because it is contrary to Article 2 paragraph (1) of Law Number 1 of 1974 on Marriage, Article 1337 and Article 1332 of the Civil Law, the principle of marriage and the purpose of marriage. Based on these provisions, a legal marriage is conducted in accordance with the teachings of religion and beliefs and is not contrary to the values ??of morality. Marriages that are registered or registered in accordance with applicable laws and regulations will receive protection from the State. The practice of contract marriage actually positions the position of women is very weak in the eyes of the law because the marriage is considered never happened, so the wife is not considered a legitimate wife, the wife is not entitled to alimony and inheritance from the husband if he dies and the wife is not entitled to gono gini property if it occurs. separation, because legally the marriage, the contractual marriage is considered to have never occurred.

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Section: Kontrak (Nikah Mut`ah) According To the Islamic Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Position of Contract Marriage Law (Nikah Mut`Ah) in Indonesia: A Comparative Study

Afrizal

2022

JRSSEM

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“…Religion and ethnic homogeneity have been shown to act as informal mechanisms to enforce contractual arrangements when well-developed legal systems are weak or absent. This literature on self-enforcement includes economic arrangements across diverse historical settings (Benson, 1990(Benson, , 2005Greif, 1993;Nair, 2011;Stringham, 2002Stringham, , 2003 but also in more recent settings. For instance, Landa (1981Landa ( , 1994 and Rauch and Trindade (2002) document that ethnic Chinese networks help to match buyers with sellers in addition to deterring opportunistic behavior.…”

Section: Cultural Attributesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Outsourcing destination choices: the role of economic and cultural attributes

Livanis

Robertson

Al-Shuaibi

et al. 2016

International Marketing Review

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how country-of-origin (COO) perceptions of managers affect their provider selection for offshoring and offshore-outsourcing of services. In particular, it examines how economic and cultural attributes of the supplier’s host nation shape these choices and identifies whether these attributes have a substitutive, complementary, or competing relationship. Design/methodology/approach – A quantitative study was performed using data collected from 235 managers in Saudi Arabia, which has relatively homogeneous managerial population with a clear significant cultural attribute and so presents an ideal setting to study the theory developed in this paper. Data were analyzed using a repeated-measures analysis of variance and a repeated-measures and doubly multivariate analysis of variance. Findings – Building on signaling theory, it is shown that buyers from developing countries prefer suppliers from developed rather than culturally distant developing economies as stronger institutions in developed nations increase the credibility of firms. It is also shown that they prefer suppliers from developing countries that share a common cultural attribute such as religion over other developing countries, supporting social identification behavior and a substitutive relationship between cultural and economic attributes. Finally, they are indifferent between suppliers located in a developed and in a culturally similar developing country, even when the cost of obtaining the service is the same in both countries. In such cases, economic and cultural COO attributes have a competing relationship in provider selection. Research limitations/implications – It would be interesting to examine if the results of the current study extend to cultural attributes/cues other than religion that may shrink the social distance between buyers and suppliers. Practical implications – Service multinationals from developing countries may struggle to establish credibility in the eyes of potential customers, who consistently evaluate them lower than firms in developed markets or firms from developing countries that share a common social trait with the potential customers. They can compensate for this by adopting policies that enhance pre-contract trust, invest in homogeneity capital that decreases the social distance between the two firms, or by focussing their sales efforts on countries with which they share a social/cultural attribute. Originality/value – This paper contributes to the marketing and international business literatures by providing insights on how firms from developing countries can effectively compete in the global marketplace given COO effects. Overall, the results provide novel evidence of the importance of co-membership in transnational communities (for instance, religious groups across countries) in supplier selection and its relationship to economic attributes.

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“…The caste is also voluntary in the sense that though one cannot switch castes, there is freedom to exit the caste at all times. Rules are enforced through the self-enforcing mechanism of endogamy (Nair, 2011) or denying marriage rites to those who disagree with temple council judgments in case of conflicts (both personal and economic).…”

Section: Bankers’ Clubs In Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Caste as self-regulatory club: evidence from a private banking system in nineteenth century India

Nair

2015

Journal of Institutional Economics

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The Chettiar banking system evolved and functioned in the absence of a government sponsored central bank in 19th-century India. I find that the underlying common social institution of caste was crucial for the workings of the banking system and effectively acted as a club. Exclusion was achieved by restricting membership by birth and the practice of endogamy. These mechanisms created the necessary incentives to provide meaningful rules as well as their enforcement. I describe and analyze the privately provided self-regulatory mechanisms of clearinghouses, inter-bank lending and information sharing. The Chettiar banking system thus adds to existing instances of self-regulated banking as well as points to the economic underpinnings of caste as an institution.

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Enforcement of nineteenth century banking contracts using a marriage rule

Cited by 3 publications

References 33 publications

The Position of Contract Marriage Law (Nikah Mut`Ah) in Indonesia: A Comparative Study

The Position of Contract Marriage Law (Nikah Mut`Ah) in Indonesia: A Comparative Study

Outsourcing destination choices: the role of economic and cultural attributes

Caste as self-regulatory club: evidence from a private banking system in nineteenth century India

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