Enforcing Honesty in Assured Information Sharing Within a Distributed System

Abstract

Abstract. The growing number of distributed information systems such as the internet has created a need for security in data sharing. When several autonomous parties attempt to share data, there is not necessarily any guarantee that the participants will share data truthfully. In fact, there is often a large incentive to engage in behavior that can sabotage the effectiveness of such a system. We analyze these situations in light of game theory, a mathematical model which permits us to consider behavior and choices for any autonomous party. This paper uses this theory to create a behavior enforcement method that does not need a central management system. We use a simple punishment method that is inherently available in most scenarios. Our approach is applicable to a variety of assured information sharing applications where the members of a coalition have to work together to solve a problem.

Incentive and Trust Issues in Assured Information Sharing

“…Several experiments proved conclusively that the LivingAgent behavior outlined in [21] both helped to eliminate malicious agents and eventually become the dominate strategy in an adaptive game. We plan to build upon the success of that agent by integrating distributed trust metrics into the decision making process.…”

“…In our previous work [21], we provide a simpler model that excludes distributed trust from behavior influence and focuses on how individual agents indirectly can contribute towards achieving a common goal in a virtual game of assured information sharing. Agents were permitted to shift their behavioral choices to more effective means through analysis at a fixed interval.…”

“…In our prior work [21], we encountered a unique yet simple approach to dealing with undesirable behavior known as the Tit-for-Tat behavior. Devised by Anatol Rapoport [13,14], it follows a simple strategy selection process.…”

“…Several of these factors have already been explored in other works (e.g., [21]). However, a factor that has not always been considered is the cost of determining whether or not information is correct.…”