2014
DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2014.964289
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Enforcing state aid rules in EU candidate countries: a qualitative comparative analysis of the direct and indirect effects of conditionality

Abstract: The article analyses the effectiveness of EU conditionality regarding the enforcement of state aid rules in candidate countries during the pre-accession phase. Theoretically, conditionality should be able to overcome the reluctance of governments to implement control systems that restrict their ability to freely allocate subsidies. Effective conditionality can take two causal paths: first, it can directly influence the political decisions of governments in candidate countries regarding state aid, independent o… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…More recent qualitative studies, such as Botta and Schwellnus (2015) have addressed the special circumstances of EU State aid control in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In the case of Ukraine, a rather limited convergence with the EU State aid rules is attributed to the role played by veto-players in the form of Ukrainian oligarchs who are able to limit convergence where it impact their interests (Dimitrova and Dragneva 2013).…”
Section: Iiii Empirical Evidence and Competing Explanationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…More recent qualitative studies, such as Botta and Schwellnus (2015) have addressed the special circumstances of EU State aid control in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In the case of Ukraine, a rather limited convergence with the EU State aid rules is attributed to the role played by veto-players in the form of Ukrainian oligarchs who are able to limit convergence where it impact their interests (Dimitrova and Dragneva 2013).…”
Section: Iiii Empirical Evidence and Competing Explanationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Existing literature on compliance with European state aid rules in CEE support the general findings of the post-accession compliance literature: not only is there no demonstrated 'Eastern problem' in state aid compliance but new EU member states appear to abide by European state aid rules more faithfully than their EU-15 counterparts (Blauberger 2009a;Hölscher et al 2017). Botta and Schwellnus (2015) attribute reductions in total state aid in the immediate period before accession to the direct effect of EU conditionality, whereby member states scrambled to meet all conditions to secure EU membership, including reducing the total amount of aid to industry. Investigating compliance three years after the 2004 enlargement, Blauberger (2009a) finds no increase in noncompliance with state aid rules.…”
Section: Conceptualizing 'Creative Compliance'mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…143 During the enlargement process, conditionality served as a proxy to expand the acquis to Central and Eastern European countries and to induce them to adjust their administrative structures for EU membership, also in regard to state aid control. 144 The new ESI funding rules, however, relaunch spending conditionalities as a stand-alone governance tool to address structural deficiencies in implementation of EU policies connected to ESI funds. By requiring Member…”
Section: Ex Ante Conditionalities For Esi Funds: Modelling Domesticmentioning
confidence: 99%