Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives

Goodin, Robert E.

doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2007.00098.x

Cited by 815 publications

(392 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…In contrast, in communities with greater reserves of 'thick trust' (Gambetta, 1988) or with more positive histories around community wind development, informal procedures may work because residents do not feel they require formal confirmation that the project leaders are acting in the community's best interest (see Simcock, 2012). Therefore, aside from broad principles any implementation process needs to avoid over generalised and simplified prescriptions of 'what works' and instead recognise 'the agency of the absent' (Bickerstaff, 2012(Bickerstaff, , p. 2611 by tailoring the details of the process to the particular community in question .…”

Section: Concluding Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 One common principle of justice here is that all those affected by a decision should be involved to some degree in making that decision (Goodin, 2007;Young, 2000). There are also pertinent questions about the responsibility to ensure presence and participation (Fuller and Bulkeley, 2013) Influence relates to the extent that different participants' opinions, suggestions and concerns shape decision outcomes (Smith, 2009).…”

Section: Analytical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Procedural justice and the implementation of community wind energy projects: A case study from South Yorkshire, UK

Simcock

2016

Land Use Policy

113

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Highlights Examines perceptions of 'procedural justice' in the implementation of a community wind project.  Challenges the notion that community energy projects will always be considered locally fair. Provides lessons of how procedural justice might be achieved in community energy schemes. AbstractIn policy and activist discourses there is often an expectation that community wind energy projects will avoid the conflicts and local opposition often associated with private-developer-led developments.However, the empirical validity of this assertion has not been widely investigated. In previous research on private-developer wind projects, the fairness of decision-making processes ('procedural justice') during project implementation has been identified as an important factor in shaping local acceptance, but has not been deeply studied in relation to community-led schemes. Using in-depth qualitative research of a proposed community wind project in South Yorkshire, this paper examines stakeholder interpretations of procedural justice during the design and siting of this scheme. Although the project leaders explicitly aimed for a fair and 'democratic' implementation process, considerable conflict emerged over whether this goal was achieved. The analysis shows that these conflicting views were the result, firstly, of different normative expectations of what 'procedural justice' actually meant and involved, and, secondly, of contrasting stakeholder experiences of the decision processes that were utilised. It cannot be assumed that community wind projects will always be considered procedurally just at the local level, with much resting on the details of how they are undertaken.

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Section: Concluding Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Analytical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Procedural justice and the implementation of community wind energy projects: A case study from South Yorkshire, UK

Simcock

2016

Land Use Policy

113

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“…That principle holds that ideally, everyone should be enfranchised to help decide all issues that significantly affect their interests, which might well mean 'giving virtually everyone everywhere a vote on virtually everything decided anywhere.' 15 Though I am not seeking to refute that principle or the more realistic variations on it that Goodin discusses, the principle of constituted identities that I am defending is confined to those whose very identities have been substantially generated by a constitutional democracy, not to all whose interests are affected by its decisions. This obligation will often support the inclusion of many who are not currently recognized as citizens of a given constitutional democracy, but it does not plausibly extend to 'virtually everyone everywhere.'…”

Section: Limits On the Obligation To Includementioning

confidence: 99%

The principle of constituted identities and the obligation to include

Smith¹

2008

Ethics & Global Politics

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Most analysts agree that democratic theorists have not offered a persuasive answer to the question of how the boundaries of a demos, a democratic people, should legitimately be defined. Some contend that boundaries should be maintained in ways that preserve sufficient sense of common identity to sustain support for redistributive policies. Many others endorse the 'principle of all affected interests,' but it has been widely criticized as unrealistically destructive of too many existing community boundaries. This essay argues for an alternative 'principle of constituted identities.' It holds that, subject to certain important qualifications, modern constitutional democracies, at least, are morally obligated to extend the option of full membership to all those whose identities have been substantially constituted through such regimes' coercive policies.

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“…A decision to alter the rules defining the demos might have consequences for future elections, which in turn may affect future policy-making of potentially great concern to people everywhere. 4 If so, the democratic approach might require the inclusion of every likely or potentially affected present or future person or non-person (Goodin, 2007).…”

Section: Pure Procedural Democratic Legitimacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Deciding the demos: three conceptions of democratic legitimacy

Beckman

2017

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosoph

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The prevailing view is that democratic procedures are unable to confer democratic legitimacy to decisions about democratic procedures. This paper examines this claim in detail and uses referendums on the inclusion of previously disenfranchised groups in the demos as a running example. The paper distinguishes between pure, imperfect and quasi-pure models of procedural democratic legitimacy and subversions of them. To various extents, each model does have the capacity to confer legitimacy to demos decisions under well-defined circumstances. The paper argues that quasi-pure procedural legitimacy represents the most promising account of democratic legitimacy in cases where democratic procedures are the subject of collective decision-making. According to this model, the decision to revise the rules for membership in the demos is permissible by democratic standards if and only if the revision is not forbidden by democratic principles for inclusion. The point is that the range of alternatives that are not forbidden by democratic principles of inclusion are likely to be considerable due to vagueness of the principles themselves and/or them being subject to reasonable disagreement. The paper concludes with a discussion about the possibility of democratic legitimacy for democratic institutions not introduced as a result of democratic decision-making.

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Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives

Cited by 815 publications

References 13 publications

Procedural justice and the implementation of community wind energy projects: A case study from South Yorkshire, UK

Procedural justice and the implementation of community wind energy projects: A case study from South Yorkshire, UK

The principle of constituted identities and the obligation to include

Deciding the demos: three conceptions of democratic legitimacy

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