England, Englishness and Brexit

Abstract

In the 1975 referendum England provided the strongest support for European integration, with a much smaller margin for membership in Scotland and Northern Ireland. By 2015 the rank order of ‘national’ attitudes to European integration had reversed. Now, England is the UK's most eurosceptic nation and may vote ‘Leave’, while Scotland seems set to generate a clear margin for ‘Remain’. The UK as a whole is a Brexit marginal. To understand the campaign, we need to make sense of the dynamics of public attitudes in each nation. We take an ‘archaeological’ approach to a limited evidence‐base, to trace the development of attitudes to Europe in England since 1975. We find evidence of a link between English nationalism and euroscepticism. Whatever the result in 2016, contrasting outcomes in England and Scotland will exacerbate tensions in the UK's territorial constitution and could lead to the break‐up of Britain.

The Social Consequences of Brexit for the UK and Europe: Euroscepticism, Populism, Nationalism, and Societal Division

“…England is divergent from Scotland and Northern Ireland (and to a lesser extent, Wales) in its Euroscepticism with many polls showing majority support for Brexit in England, compared with 65 percent support for remaining in the EU in Scotland (Henderson et al 2016). Indeed, survey data shows that the more strongly individuals identify as English, the more likely they are to support withdrawal from the EU (while conversely in Scotland, those who see themselves as…”

“…British are more likely to be in favor of Brexit) (Henderson et al 2016). This has connected populist Euroscepticism with English nationalism (Gifford 2006(Gifford , 2008, which helps to define the values that underpin the populist conception of the "heartland.…”

“…This initial analysis suggests that the Brexit (British Exit) vote reveals wider and deeper societal tensions along the lines of age, class, income, and education (Goodwin and Heath 2016). By providing an account of the background and events of the referendum, this article asserts that the vote was a case study in populist right-wing Eurosceptic discourse (Leconte 2010; Taggart 2004), but it also reveals strong elements of English nationalism (including British exceptionalism and social conservatism) in parts of British society (Henderson et al 2016;Wellings 2010). Given this, the article begins to make sense of Brexit from a social quality perspective and outlines a possible social quality approach to the UK and Europe post-Brexit.…”

Scapegoats, silver bullets, and other pitfalls in the path to sustainability

“…In 2016, it was a majority of the British people who voted for the exit of Britain from the European Union, joining with some politicians in blaming the EU and immigrants for systemic economic difficulties (Henderson et al 2016;Goodwin 2016). Similarly, in the 2016 US elections, populist candidates on the left (Sanders) and right (Trump) were supported by (some) people who cast all blame for the increasing inequality in the US on either corporations and corrupt politicians (left) or on immigrants, Muslims, and corrupt politicians (right).…”

Democratizing Candidate Selection

“…Against a backdrop of growing nationalist sentiments across England (Henderson et al, 2016;Kenny, 2016) and Scotland (Pattie & Johnston, 2017)-yet with very distinct motivations and aspirations-and a disconnect between mainstream national political parties (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats) and their traditional voter base, the raise in support for parties such as UKIP and the Greens, for instance, has been somewhat masked by their electoral insignificance at national level (Ford & Goodwin, 2014), which is a direct effect of the electoral system used in the UK. The debates in the lead up to the EU Referendum are, however, a glaring example of marginalising gender, yet with serious implications (Guerrina & Masselot, 2018;Guerrina & Murphy, 2016;Haastrup, Wright, & Guerrina, 2016).…”