Liberty is a practice. So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even to break them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. (Michel Foucault/Space, Knowledge, Power' [an interview],
1982)The Commonwealth of learning here is taking a complete holiday; we have all become politicians. (John Locke to P. van Limborch, 7 August 1689) I Recently, liberal theory has been confronting itself in a historical guise. One result has been an interpretation that says it is simply one tradition among others and thus embodies certain contingent rather than universal features. More interestingly, another interpretation claims that even if this is the case, it is a 'contingent' tradition that embodies universal claims; it might just be a tradition but it is one that includes, for example, the Declaration of the Universal Rights of Man.' Whatever the case, there is a need to come up with the goods, so to speak, and to show as precisely and carefully as possible the historical contours of this tradition. There are (at least) two general reasons for doing so. One is to identify a cluster of practices or constraints working on or through an ideology, and which seem to remain opaque to its objects (and sometimes its practitioners); hence the imperative to 'excavate' or 'restore'. The second reason is that in doing so we loosen the grip of these conceptions and practices by seeing them as recent or contingent, and thus learn to distinguish between 'the necessary' and possibly modifiable. The point, as Foucault put it, is to lay the depth out in front; 'depth is