Enhancement of Two-Factor User Authentication in Wireless Sensor Networks

Abstract

Wireless sensor networks are widely used for applications such as environmental monitoring, airport safety, health care, etc. For user authentication, in 2009, Das proposed a two-factor user authentication scheme in wireless sensor networks. They claimed that this scheme provided efficiency, strong security, and user anonymity property. However, we find that Das's scheme is still vulnerable to masquerade attack and cannot achieve user anonymity. This paper will propose an improvement to remedy the weakness of Das's scheme.

Efficient security mechanism to counter the malicious attack in wireless sensor networks

“…Huang, Chang [14] proposed an ''Enhancement Of Two Factor User Authentication In Wireless Sensor Network''. Das's [13] proposed a two-factor user authentication scheme in wireless sensor networks.…”

“…al. [3] Das [13] H e [ 16] Algahathour [17] Huang [14] Vaidya [15] Arikuma [12] Yeh [18] Sun et al [5] Our security framework can effectively defend against the Sybil attack, the node replication attack, and the wormhole attack by including the security time stamp in our protocol, a new node is only allowed to join the sensor network during its time stamp length. After that it becomes an old node.…”

A Security-Performance-Balanced User Authentication Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks

“…We also illustrate how [8] is vulnerable to parallel session and privileged-insider attacks and how it does not provide mutual authentication and password change features. Additionally, we explain how [9] is defenseless against parallel session, privileged-insider, and gateway-node bypassing attacks, does not offer a password change mechanism, and has a serious vulnerability in its mutual authentication mechanism.…”

“…Nyang and Lee [7] identified that Das' protocol was vulnerable to offline password guessing and sensor node compromising attacks. Huang et al [8] also identified some limitations of Das' scheme, such as vulnerability from an impersonation attack. Additionally, [9] pointed out the absence of a mutual authentication feature in Das' protocol, while Khan and Alghathbar [10] pointed out more security flaws of Das' proposal, noting that it was vulnerable to privileged-insider and gateway-node bypassing attacks.…”

“…Additionally, [9] pointed out the absence of a mutual authentication feature in Das' protocol, while Khan and Alghathbar [10] pointed out more security flaws of Das' proposal, noting that it was vulnerable to privileged-insider and gateway-node bypassing attacks. References [7][8][9][10] also proposed enhanced versions of Das' protocol to eliminate detected vulnerabilities. However, those proposals still include several vulnerabilities and limitations that an adversary could take advantage of.…”