Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach

Jakobeit, Cord

doi:10.7135/upo9780857288189.011

Cited by 3 publications

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“…The substantial literature on reforms of the World Bank and the IMF says surprisingly little about voting power reforms, beyond the oft‐repeated proposal for double‐majority voting – a majority of votes and a majority of countries (Jakobeit, ; Woods, ).…”

Section: Policy Optionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The substantial literature on reforms of the World Bank and the IMF says surprisingly little about voting power reforms, 11 beyond the oft-repeated proposal for doublemajority votinga majority of votes and a majority of countries (Jakobeit, 2005;Woods, 2006). Dervis and € Ozer propose a voting system for a new Economic and Social Security Council at the UN, which could function as a prototype for the IMF's and World Bank's boards.…”

Section: Policy Optionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Still in the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk

Vestergaard

Wade

2014

Global Policy

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The Western hegemony of the past 200 years is ending as power shifts towards the East and as Western states lose the authority to uphold a rules-based multilateral order. In the wake of the Great Crash of 2008 the G20 leaders took steps to bolster the multilateral order, including reform of the governance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank so as to reflect the increasing economic weight of developing countries. The executive boards of both organizations affirmed that the primary criterion for allocating voting shares should be shares of world GDP. We show that the reforms at the IMF and the World Bank have substantially failed to meet their ostensible objectives. First, in both organizations the developed countries gained voting share relative to GDP share between 2009 and 2014. Second, countries continue to vary widely in their share of votes relative to share of world GDP; in both organizations some countries have six times or more the votes relative to GDP of others. Politicians and analysts should give attention to achieving more equitable governance in these important multilateral organizations. At the end of this article we show how this could be done. Policy Implications• To strengthen the multilateral order the Bretton Woods organizations should make a more determined effort than hitherto to adapt their governance structures to changes in the relative economic importance of countries.

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Section: Policy Optionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Policy Optionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Still in the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk

Vestergaard

Wade

2014

Global Policy

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“…Analysis of formal voting rules does not capture other very important aspects of Bank decision making, such as Executive Board–staff relations, informal negotiations, and Bank‐related negotiations that take place outside of the Bank's formal organization (e.g., G8 meetings). On these other aspects of influence see Jakobeit (), Kapur (), Nielson et al. (), Wade () and Woods and Narlikar ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Did Recent Voice Reforms Improve Good Governance within the World Bank?

Strand¹,

Retzl²

2016

Development and Change

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Using the concept of good governance, this article assesses how voting rules in the World Bank Group's primary loan facility determine members’ ability to influence the formation of winning coalitions in the Executive Board. In weighted voting systems, the percentage of votes held by an actor does not adequately measure the ability of that actor to affect outcomes because voting weights do not account for either the possible number of coalitions that may form or the number of votes needed to pass a resolution. In short, weighted voting systems cannot be straightforwardly analysed with reference to voting weights but instead require the determination of relative voting power. Using multiple measures of a priori voting power, data are presented before and after recent voice reforms. Results indicate that the United States, as expected, holds the largest share of voting power. Also, as expected, most borrowing members have little voting power. Unexpectedly, in several voting groups a single member is able to ensure its election to the Board. Hence, other members of these voting groups have no formal influence on the Board. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of voting power analysis for the concept of good governance within the World Bank.

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Good Governance within the World Bank: Assessing Recent Reforms

Strand

Retzl

2014

SSRN Journal

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Enhancing the Voice of Developing Countries in The World Bank: Selective Double Majority Voting and a Pilot Phase Approach

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Still in the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk

Still in the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk

Did Recent Voice Reforms Improve Good Governance within the World Bank?

Good Governance within the World Bank: Assessing Recent Reforms

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