Entangled phronesis and the four causes of emulation: Developmental insights into role modelling

Abstract

A new theory of emulation – the method by which one learns from moral role models – is emerging through the combined efforts of philosophers, psychologists and educationists. Using a previous argument reconceptualising emulation as a moral virtue as a philosophical springboard, in this paper, I extend this theory by building a more robust case for how emulation qua role modelling works in practice through direct appeal to Aristotle’s account of causation: the four causes. Historically revered for their explanatory power, I argue that reconstructing the four causes and synthesising them with emulation enables us to better comprehend it as a quadripartite causal process. Through doing so, I propose that emulation is driven by ‘entangled phronesis’ – a mechanism which enables immature moral learners to acquire virtue by sharing in the phronesis, that is, practical wisdom, of a role model. Since the degree of entanglement depends upon a learner’s phase of virtuous character development, I also divide emulation into two types: pre-phronetic ‘habituated emulation’ and phronetically-informed ‘complete emulation’. Combined with my four-causal account of emulation, these concepts represent a novel contribution to neo-Aristotelian character developmental theory and help explain – step-by-step – the method by which one potentially acquires moral virtue and phronesis from moral role models.

Why do we need to employ exemplars in moral education? Insights from recent advances in research on artificial intelligence

“…For example, we may imagine a situation where a student lives with virtuous close exemplars, such as friends, family members, teachers, and community members who implement virtues and moral values (Henderson, 2024a(Henderson, , 2023Kristjánsson, 2006;Sanderse, 2012). In such a case, it is predictable that the influential relatable exemplars positively influence the student's moral motivation and development, as suggested by previous moral exemplar studies (e.g., Čehajić-Clancy & Bilewicz, 2021;Han et al, 2017Han et al, , 2022Han & Dawson, 2023;Han & Graham, 2023).…”

“…Also, they can provide information about adjusting the learning process when students encounter different external situations challenging their existing views and beliefs (Han, 2023a). Phronesis exemplars can facilitate optimal moral learning as living mentors for self-cultivation and autonomous moral growth (Athanassoulis & Han, 2023;Henderson, 2023). Finally, because phronesis requires one's capacity to deal with diverse situations in reality (Hacker-Wright, 2023;Kristjánsson, 2014), which should be well generalizable, an exemplar-based approach might be a viable educational approach, as shown by AI studies (Campolo & Schwerzmann, 2023;Van Der Waa et al, 2021).…”

“…According to this idea, even if students do not possess fully cultivated phronesis, which is required for optimally practicing moral virtue, they can habituate phronesis by emulating moral role models, such as teachers (Henderson, 2024a(Henderson, , 2023. Hence, emulating moral exemplars is virtuous and a fundamental process towards internalizing and cultivating the virtue of phronesis (Athanassoulis & Han, 2023;Han, 2023a).…”

Beyond Admiration: Rethinking the Nature of Emulation qua Role Modelling

“…Before I proceed, I will take a moment to outline the scope which I intend this analysis of emulation qua role modelling to encompass. For reasons of space, I cannot go into as much depth as I would like, and thus direct readers to two recent papers which add further contours and nuance to the arguments I briefly summarise here (Henderson, 2022;2023). Furthermore, it should be noted that whilst my position is inherently reconstructive rather than exegetical in nature, I maintain that synthesising much of what follows with Aristotle's ethics and metaphysics can meaningfully extend the contemporary understanding of emulation in neo-Aristotelian character education.…”

“…It is worth noting here that in contrast to Zagzebski (2017), I accommodate admiration within just the material cause, understand it as merely a physiological feeling, and do not elevate it to the status of full-blown virtuous emotion. It is also worth noting that I have constructed and defended a full four-causal account of emulation (Henderson, 2023), yet for present purposes this deliberately brief nod to it will suffice.…”