1999
DOI: 10.1920/re.ifs.1999.0059
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Entering work and the British tax and benefit system

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 48 publications
(40 citation statements)
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References 11 publications
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“…We show both the average withdrawal rate (AWR) and the replacement ratio as the AWR does not take income effects into account. This has different implications in different circumstances: Gregg et al (1999a) argue that replacement ratios give misleading impressions of work incentives for ... (cont) There is certainly a strong financial incentive to do some work: in these 12 States, a lone parent moving into part-time work will keep at least 70% of her gross earnings. In…”
Section: Replacement Ratios and Average Withdrawal Ratesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We show both the average withdrawal rate (AWR) and the replacement ratio as the AWR does not take income effects into account. This has different implications in different circumstances: Gregg et al (1999a) argue that replacement ratios give misleading impressions of work incentives for ... (cont) There is certainly a strong financial incentive to do some work: in these 12 States, a lone parent moving into part-time work will keep at least 70% of her gross earnings. In…”
Section: Replacement Ratios and Average Withdrawal Ratesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This approach would therefore fail to show any difference between Family Credit and WFTC resulting from the redistribution of resources away from main carers (mostly mothers) and toward main earners (mostly fathers). In fact, this part of the reform was not considered in the simu lation of the WFTC conducted both by Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000), and Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Using structural modeling, Blundell et al (2000), Gregg et al (1999), and Paull et al (2000) predict that the 1999 reform should lead to a 1½-2½ percentage point increase in the employment rate of single mothers, while Blundell et al (2000) and Gregg et al (1999) predict that the labor force participation rates for married women should fall. This study presents a straightforward natural experiment, focusing on only the 1999 tax credit reform.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%