Entrepreneurial Politics in Mid-Victorian Britain

Searle, G. R.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198203575.001.0001

Cited by 70 publications

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“…Both the concepts of CSR and corporate philanthropy often are traced to the Industrial Revolution, when individual business owners invested in the well‐being of their staff to improve productivity and achieve greater social goals (Searle, ; Lee, ). Such strategies were uncommon, and early attempts to engender CSR were viewed as incompatible with capitalism by shareholders, courts, and commentators (Cochran, ).…”

Section: Contemporary Csr and Corporate Philanthropymentioning

confidence: 99%

Charitable Partnerships among Travel and Tourism Businesses: Perspectives from Low‐Fares Airlines

Fenclova

Coles

2011

Journal of Tourism Research

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SUMMARYResponsibility has been advocated as a key concept for the future management and governance of the tourism sector, in particular the sustainable development of destinations, yet it has not been the subject of extensive empirical research among businesses and organisations. This paper addresses this knowledge gap by examining corporate philanthropy practises among low-fares airlines as an innovativeand increasingly popular form of tourism stakeholder. An analytical framework is developed and applied.Corporate philanthropy is practised more widely than may have been anticipated by the low-fares business model. For studies of tourism, the paper points to the need for greater theoretical and conceptual urgency in research on CSR and corporate philanthropy if future practical action at the destination level is to match current advocacy.

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Section: Contemporary Csr and Corporate Philanthropymentioning

confidence: 99%

Charitable Partnerships among Travel and Tourism Businesses: Perspectives from Low‐Fares Airlines

Fenclova

Coles

2011

Journal of Tourism Research

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“…The alternative, he implied, was that pressures for reform might become overwhelming, as they had in France (see Schonhard-Bailey, 2006). In sum, repeal was an attempt to moderate the mounting pressures for parliamentary reform: by satisfying the middle class and industrialists with repeal, their drive to gain control of parliamentary seats would wane and, moreover, the working-class Chartist movement (seeking more radical reform of Parliament) would lose momentum (see Searle, 1993;and Schonhard-Bailey, 2006). In terms of our model, the protectionist aristocracy, by partially transferring control over the government to the pro-free-trade industrialists (the Reform Act of 1832) and allowing a switch in trade policy (the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846), placated the populace, thereby convincing it to relinquish its more radical demands.…”

Section: Great Britain In the Nineteenth Centurymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the one hand, Great Britain moved toward free trade in 1846 (with the repeal of the Corn Laws) before becoming a democracy. The repeal of the Corn Laws undercutt the economic interests of the ruling landed aristocracy, proved that industrialists were gaining control of Parliament, and placated the working-class Chartist movement, which was seeking a more radical reform of Parliament (see Searle, 1993, andSchonhard-Bailey, 2006). Thereafter, Great Britain had a stable free-trade policy throughout its transition to a fully consolidated democracy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocracy, democracy and trade policy

Galiani

Torrens

2014

Journal of International Economics

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“…On the other hand, if democratization leads to aut(s), l always prefers to transfer the control of the autocracy to s the first time that µ t = µ, since it makes no sense for l to democratize for the sole purpose of postponing the arrival of aut(s). 3 Suppose thatφ 3 ≤ ϕ < min λφ2 (λ), wherē Then, from (32) and (33), if l democratizes the first that time µ t = µ, then, no matter what policy is implemented by N , a coup is always a possibility. Thus, democracy cannot be semi-consolidated, and the most that N can do is to influence which elite group controls the autocracy after the coup.…”

Section: Proof Of Proposition 2 Parts a And Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocracy, Democracy and Trade Policy

Galiani

Torrens

2013

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This paper develops a politico-economic model for use in studying the role of intra-elite conflict in the simultaneous determination of a country's political regime, trade policy and income-tax-based redistribution scheme. Three socioeconomic groups are involved: two elite groups and workers, whose preferences regarding trade policy and income taxation are derived from a simple open-economy model. The critical point is that income taxation induces a rich-poor/elite-workers political cleavage, while trade policy opens the door to intra-elite conflict. In this model, when there is no intra-elite conflict, changes in trade policy are associated with political transitions. Coups (democratizations) open up the economy if and only if both elite factions are pro-free-trade (protectionist). However, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, autocracies respond to popular revolts by changing trade their policy and reallocating political power within the elite (to the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers) rather than offering to democratize the country. The change in trade policy is credible because the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers controls the autocracy. Moreover, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, coups tend to result in the maintenance of the existing trade policy unless popular demands are extremely radical and/or the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers is exceptionally weak. AbstractThis paper develops a politico-economic model for use in studying the role of intra-elite conflict in the simultaneous determination of a country's political regime, trade policy and income-tax-based redistribution scheme. Three socioeconomic groups are involved: two elite groups and workers, whose preferences regarding trade policy and income taxation are derived from a simple open-economy model. The critical point is that income taxation induces a rich-poor/elite-workers political cleavage, while trade policy opens the door to intra-elite conflict. In this model, when there is no intra-elite conflict, changes in trade policy are associated with political transitions. Coups (democratizations) open up the economy if and only if both elite factions are pro-free-trade (protectionist). However, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, autocracies respond to popular revolts by changing trade their policy and reallocating political power within the elite (to the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers) rather than offering to democratize the country. The change in trade policy is credible because the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers controls the autocracy. Moreover, in the presence of intra-elite conflict, coups tend to result in the maintainance of the existing trade policy unless popular demands are extremely radical and/or the elite group with the same trade policy preference as the workers is exceptionally weak.JEL Classification: D72, D78.1 politico-economic model of autocracy and democr...

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Entrepreneurial Politics in Mid-Victorian Britain

Cited by 70 publications

References 0 publications

Charitable Partnerships among Travel and Tourism Businesses: Perspectives from Low‐Fares Airlines

Charitable Partnerships among Travel and Tourism Businesses: Perspectives from Low‐Fares Airlines

Autocracy, democracy and trade policy

Autocracy, Democracy and Trade Policy

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