Entry License Tax: Stackelberg versus Cournot

Cato, Susumu; Matsumura, Toshihiro

doi:10.1628/jite-2019-0015

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…14 Since entry is a long-term choice, we suppose that the Stackelberg-leader chooses its output after the followers have decided on entry (see Mukherjee (2012b) and Chao et al (2017) for comparable approaches in the analysis of entry decisions). In contrast, Etro (2007Etro ( , 2008 and Cato and Matsumura (2019) assume that the Stackelberg-leader chooses its quantity before followers can enter. Ino and Matsumura (2012) denote the alternative settings as weakly and strongly persistent-leadership models.…”

Section: Market Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Partisan competition authorities, Cournot‐oligopoly, and endogenous market structure

Goerke

2022

Southern Economic Journal

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The so‐called excess‐entry theorem establishes conditions guaranteeing that more firms enter a homogeneous Cournot‐oligopoly in equilibrium than a benevolent government prefers. We generalize the approach and analyze the behavior of a competition authority, which attaches different weights to the firms' and consumers' payoffs, with welfare‐maximization constituting a special case. The greater the importance of consumers, the less likely entry restrictions are, whereas a greater relevance of firms makes a monopoly more probable. The nature of entry restrictions also depends on the competition authority's instruments. The essential insights continue to apply if firms are heterogeneous concerning costs and the timing of output choices.

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