Environmental Policy Gridlock

Shafie, David M.

doi:10.4324/9780429487927-1

Cited by 1 publication

(4 citation statements)

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“…Therefore, our study brings attention to the federal government in the context of the executive branch. Our results affirm concerns about presidential administrations becoming more emboldened to use executive authority to meet political environmental policy goals (Fiorino, 2022; Rabe, 2022; Shafie, 2020). Given that congress remains extremely polarized on environmental policy matters (Bromley-Trujillo & Nolette, 2023; Deslatte, 2023; Dishman, 2023) current and future presidential administrations are expected to use executive actions to alter environmental policy again (Rabe, 2022; Shafie, 2020).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 73%

“…Our results affirm concerns about presidential administrations becoming more emboldened to use executive authority to meet political environmental policy goals (Fiorino, 2022; Rabe, 2022; Shafie, 2020). Given that congress remains extremely polarized on environmental policy matters (Bromley-Trujillo & Nolette, 2023; Deslatte, 2023; Dishman, 2023) current and future presidential administrations are expected to use executive actions to alter environmental policy again (Rabe, 2022; Shafie, 2020). This could lead to poor implementation outcomes at the local level, warranting further investigation into the link between the administrative presidency and local environmental governance.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 73%

“…This stagnation has inadvertently expanded presidential power over environmental governance in what has been referred to as the “administrative presidency” to fill this federal environmental policy void (Lowande & Milkis, 2014; Moore, 2018; Roberts, 2021; Vig, 2022). Since the 1990s, presidents have increasingly used executive authority to enhance or weaken the implementation of environmental policy (Hejny, 2018; Shafie, 2020). The stark contrast in environmental policy agendas between the Democratic and Republican parties has raised concerns about whether the administrative presidency has detrimental effects on environmental policy implementation and its efficacy in fostering environmental innovations (Fiorino, 2022; Rabe, 2022; Shafie, 2020; Turner, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since the 1990s, presidents have increasingly used executive authority to enhance or weaken the implementation of environmental policy (Hejny, 2018; Shafie, 2020). The stark contrast in environmental policy agendas between the Democratic and Republican parties has raised concerns about whether the administrative presidency has detrimental effects on environmental policy implementation and its efficacy in fostering environmental innovations (Fiorino, 2022; Rabe, 2022; Shafie, 2020; Turner, 2018). Given these concerns, it is important to understand the top-down effects of the Trump administrative presidency on environmental governance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The Transaction Costs of the Administrative Presidency: Evidence From a Trump-Era Clean Water Act Enforcement Reduction

Barnes,

Farmer

2024

The American Review of Public Administration

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Over the last two decades, political polarization has gridlocked federal congressional capacity to meet environmental regulatory demands. As a result, presidential authority has expanded to overcome this legislative impediment leading to a new era of “administrative presidency.” In this new era, presidents have increasingly used their administrative authority to meet politically driven environmental goals. Yet, we still know little about how federal-level executive political actions impact the outcomes and operations of local regulatory environmental systems. This study fills this scholarly void by empirically testing the effect of a federal COVID-19 Clean Water Act (CWA) enforcement reduction on Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) implementation outcomes for local community water systems (CWSs) sourcing from surface waters (SWs). Using a framework grounded in transaction cost federalism, we argue that a politically motivated executive reduction in federal CWA enforcement is associated with poor local SDWA implementation outcomes. We test this assumption with a differences-in-differences econometric approach using data drawn from the federal Safe Drinking Water Information System database. Our findings suggest that the CWA enforcement reduction resulted in an over 50% increase in SDWA health violations by CWSs sourcing from SWs. The implications of this study extend to U.S. water policy and environmental federalism, highlighting the need for better coordination between the CWA and SDWA and the potential risks associated with relying on broadened executive actions to drive U.S. environmental policy. Further research is warranted to understand the consequences of administrative policy changes on U.S. environmental governance.

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