Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit

Revesz, Richard L.

doi:10.2307/1073657

Cited by 194 publications

(115 citation statements)

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“…Indeed, the extant social science literature on judging typically defines institutions as sets of rules that structure interactions (see, for example, Epstein and Knight 1998;Murphy 1964), not as rules that establish outcomes, and it typically views the choices judges make as a function of many other forces, including the judges' own political preferences and personal attributes, features of the external environment in which they deliberate, and the characteristics of the particular suits they must resolve (see, for example, Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999;Cross and Tiller 1998;George and Epstein 1992;Gryski, Main, and Dixon 1986;Pinello 2003;Revesz 1997;Segal, Cameron, and Songer 1995).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?

Baldez

Epstein

Martin³

2006

The Journal of Legal Studies

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For over 3 decades, those engaged in the battle over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), along with many scholarly commentators, have argued that ratification of the amendment will lead U.S. courts (1) to elevate the standard of law they now use to adjudicate claims of sex discrimination, which, in turn, could lead them (2) to find in favor of parties claiming a denial of their rights. We investigate both possibilities via an examination of constitutional sex discrimination litigation in the 50 states-over a third of which have adopted ERAs.Employing methods especially developed for this investigation, we find no direct effect of the ERA on case outcomes. But we do identify an indirect effect: the presence of an ERA significantly increases the likelihood of a court applying a higher standard of law, which in turn significantly increases the likelihood of a decision favoring the equality claim.

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?

Baldez

Epstein

Martin³

2006

The Journal of Legal Studies

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“…Circuit over important environmental statutes, in a single court (Revesz 1997a). It might be the case that economies of scale of operating at the Federal level would more than outweigh the increased free-rider problems.…”

Section: Normative Foundation For Public Choice Claimsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental Law and Policy

Revesz

Stavins

2007

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This chapter for the Handbook of Law and Economics provides an economic perspective of environmental law and policy. We examine the ends of environmental policy, that is, the setting of goals and targets, beginning with normative issues, notably the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the related method of assessment known as benefit-cost analysis. We examine this analytical method in detail, including its theoretical foundations and empirical methods of estimation of compliance costs and environmental benefits. We review critiques of benefit-cost analysis, and examine alternative approaches to analyzing the goals of environmental policies. We examine the means of environmental policy, that is, the choice of specific policy instruments, beginning with an examination of potential criteria for assessing alternative instruments, with particular focus on cost-effectiveness. The theoretical foundations and experiential highlights of individual instruments are reviewed, including conventional, command-and-control mechanisms, market-based instruments, and liability rules. Three cross-cutting issues receive attention: uncertainty; technological change; and distributional considerations. We identify normative lessons in regard to design, implementation, and the identification of new applications, and we examine positive issues: the historical dominance of command-and-control; the prevalence in new proposals of tradeable permits allocated without charge; and the relatively recent increase in attention given to market-based instruments. We also examine the question of how environmental responsibility is and should be allocated among the various levels of government. We provide a positive review of the responsibilities of Federal, state, and local levels of government in the environmental realm, plus a normative assessment of this allocation of regulatory responsibility. We focus on three arguments that have been made for Federal environmental regulation: competition among political jurisdictions and the race to the bottom; transboundary environmental problems; and public choice and systematic bias. Richard L. Revesz

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“…There is by now an enormous literature indicating that race, gender, and the party of the nominating President affects the decisions of appellate judges, especially in politically sensitive cases. Some of the key studies are George and Epstein (1992), Brenner and Spaeth (1995), Revesz (1997), Pinello (1999), Klein (2002), Sunstein, Schkade and Ellman (2004), and Hansford and Spriggs (2006). For trial courts, the evidence is more limited, although some studies find significant exercise of discretion in criminal sentencing (Partridge andEldridge 1974, Abrams et al 2006) and in bankruptcy decisions (Chang and Schoar 2006).…”

Section: Average Damages and The Number And Severity Of Accidentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judicial Fact Discretion

Gennaioli¹,

Shleifer²

2006

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Does it matter for the outcome of a trial who the judge is? Legal practitioners typically believe that the answer is yes, yet legal scholarship sees trial judges as predictably enforcing established law. Following Frank (1951), we suggest here that trial judges exercise considerable discretion in finding facts, which explains the practitioners perspective and other aspects of trials. We identify two motivations for the exercise of such discretion: judicial policy preferences and judges aversion to reversal on appeal when the law is unsettled. In the latter case, judges exercising fact discretion find the facts that fit the settled precedents, even when they have no policy preferences. In a standard model of a tort, judicial fact discretion leads to setting of damages unpredictable from true facts of the case but predictable from knowledge of judicial preferences, it distorts the number and severity of accidents, and generates welfare losses. It also raises the incidence of litigation relative to settlement, and encourages litigants to take extreme positions in court, especially in new and complex disputes where the law is unsettled.

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Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit

Cited by 194 publications

References 0 publications

Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?

Does the U.S. Constitution Need an Equal Rights Amendment?

Environmental Law and Policy

Judicial Fact Discretion

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