The methodological divisions in ethics result in fundamental consequences
both on the conceptual level and in the practical applicability of such
ethics. These divisions arise from broader theoretical positions, however
they are also the work of individual moral sensibilities or 'moral
instincts', as they are called at least in the Hegelian tradition. The
deontological, consequentialist, vrtue-, developmental and other
methodological models of ethics have facilitated a miltiplication of
standards of ethical argument. This process has been intellectually
productive, however at the same time it has created significant problems for
practical philosophy, especially for applied philosophical areas which
require a clearly defined and specific referential relationship between the
key values formative of the respective ethical models on the one hand, and
the concrete moral challenges encountered by the proponents of such ethics,
on the other. The contemporary, value- and methodologically transformative
age, requires ethics to go beyond the methodological and conceptual
reductionism and adopt a synthetic and eclectic approach to moral argument.
The first question to be asked in this context is what types of already
available normative ethical models might be reinterpreted and further
developed into synthetic ethics. This paper discusses the ethics of
asceticism, primarily in the form of Christian ethics, as a good candidate
for a comprehensive and synthetic ethics. The paper purports to elucidate, on
various levels, the potential of ascetic ethics to integrate elements of
eudaimonistic ethics, duty ethics, virtue-ethics, consequentialist and
deontological ethical methodologies. To do so the paper focuses two key and,
at least by my lights, provocative questions: (1) To what extent the ethics
of asceticism is 'negative' and based solely on the principles of
self-denial, and to what extent is it able to incorporate a positive dynamic
content? In other words, can the ascetic Christian ethics be interpreted so
that it is able to integrate the concept of pleasure in the meaning of
'eudaimonia'? (2) Is an ascetic ethics able to generate specific moral
questions instrumental to a moral justification of asctions, which would
meaningfully integrate the various methods of ethical argument (minimally the
deontological, consequentialist and virtue-ethics)? If this consideration is
able to show that ascetic ethics can achieve both goals, one could reasonably
conclude that it is a good candidate for a general eclectic ethics. Of
course, this would not automatically mean that the asectic ethics is the only
potentially synthetic ethics, however it would facilitate a broader
conceptualisation of asceticism as a practical way of moral thinking geared
towards achieving a 'good life'. At the same time, such a consideration might
open an additional inroad into the formulation of general criteria which
practical philosophy, and especially ethics, would need to fulfil in order to
address the composite and synthetic issues that life in a transformative age
presents.