Epidemic policing: The spreading of counter-radicalization in Denmark

Abstract

This article offers a theoretical and ethnographic account of what I term “epidemic policing.” The article introduces the notion of epidemic policing to show how Danish measures for countering violent extremism are based on an epidemiological approach resembling the World Health Organization public health rationale, and how the field of countering violent extremism policing is itself expanding in epidemic ways. With an empirical starting point in ethnographic fieldwork among the police in Denmark’s second city, Aarhus, the article ponders the intersection between crime prevention and countering violent extremism in urban policing. The article shows that while traditional Danish crime prevention has been marked by conventional processes of securitization and topographical forms of policing, a particular form of topological policing is implied in the security logics of countering violent extremism. This new form of policing entails a reconfiguration of the epidemiological approach, including a diffusion of encoded risk categories, an expansion of institutional security infrastructures, and a de-territorialization of the space that is being policed. The article argues that this reconfiguration of Danish urban policing is a highly spatialized process, which has resulted in the co-production of intensified territorial control and an inert potentiality of policing everywhere in the city.

Prevention of Radicalization as an Emergent Field of Plural Policing in Norway: The Accelerating Role of Militant Islamists

“…The increased importance and impact of intelligence in the police seemingly blurs distinctions between their proactive and reactive measures, and also perhaps those between preventive intelligence gathering and criminal investiga-tion (Gundhus, 2018). Research on the policing of RVE in Denmark has also shown that its multi-agency approach to PRVE, which extends policing practices into various sectors of the welfare system, also leads to the blurring of boundaries between security and other public services (Johansen, 2020).…”

“…Andersson (2019, p. 63) goes so far as to say that "most forms of deviant ideas, behaviors and experiences" are depicted as possible indicators of radicalization in local policy documents in Scandinavia. The dilemma for PRVE practitioners is thus to walk the thin line between "mind policing" and the prevention of a potential terror attack (Johansen, 2020).…”

How Should the Irish State Respond to the Radicalisation of Irish Citizens in Support of Islamist Terrorism?

“…In the UK, the perception of Prevent is that it is police-led, with social services secondary (Ragazzi, 2017). In Denmark, by contrast, a 'whole of society' approach is used, with social services in the lead (Johansen, 2019). The references to radicalisation in Irish government documents indicate that while the Irish state is aware of the challenges around the issue of radicalisation, it appears to be responding in a sector-specific fashion (DOJ, 2017;Gallagher, 2019), and has not yet addressed the challenge of formulating a coherent strategy, as has been implemented in other European countries.…”

“…The approaches adopted by the UK and Denmark have differed, though both are guided by the goal of addressing the social context, ideological issues and human factors which have been identified in the models of radicalisation examined earlier. Whereas Ragazzi (2017, p. 169) posits that the UK's Prevent model reflects a "securitisation of social policy", the approach in Denmark has been labelled by Johansen (2019) as the "welfarization of security" (p. 2). These differing approaches reflect a pattern which will merit further exploration in Part Three of this study, since they go to the heart of what will be the priorities within the respective national strategies.…”

“…Figure 2.6., below, illustrates the framework for interventions within the Danish approach, based on the assessment of an individuals' risk of radicalisation (Government of Denmark, 2016). The base level of the pyramid seeks to reach all members of society, but especially the young, to engender trust and faith in citizenship and democratic values from a young age (Johansen, 2019). At the second level, those displaying evidence of risk of radicalisation are assessed at the local level and may be the subject of interventions if necessary (Vidino, 2013).…”