Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues

Reed, Baron

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2001.tb01831.x

Cited by 15 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Epistemic agency, then, refers to activities involving knowledge and knowing. A common conception presupposes that epistemic agents are responsible for what they themselves know and that knowledge arises from choices for which the agent is responsible (Reed, 2001). Epistemic agency is also one of the principles in the design of knowledge-building communities (Scardamalia, 2002;Scardamalia & Bereiter, 2003).…”

Section: Perspectives On Epistemic Agencymentioning

confidence: 98%

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Shared Epistemic Agency: An Empirical Study of an Emergent Construct

Damşa

Kirschner

Andriessen

et al. 2010

Journal of the Learning Sciences

180

157

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Journal of the Learning SciencesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:This article reports on a qualitative study of the construct of shared epistemic agency, investigated in the context of collaborative instructional design activities of university students. The aim of the study is to shed light on the notion of shared epistemic agency and to create empirical grounding for its theoretical description. The current study provides an account of the construct, based on a review of several theoretical conceptualizations and on the analysis of empirical material from 2 case studies from university education. We investigate shared epistemic agency within the specific framework of the knowledge creation perspective on learning, viewing it as the capacity that enables deliberate collaborative efforts of groups to create shared knowledge objects. Our study identifies and describes 2 core dimensions of shared epistemic agency: the epistemic and the regulative dimensions. We identify actions within each dimension that indicate the manifestation of shared epistemic agency in the practice of collaborative creation of shared knowledge objects. This study also distinguishes patterns of action that provide indications of how shared epistemic agency is differently articulated in the 2 groups' collaborative object-oriented activities.

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Section: Perspectives On Epistemic Agencymentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Philosophical perspectives consider agency to represent one's ability to exert control over one's course of actions, to determine how to apply one's will in concrete acts (Reed, 2001) and to enable individuals to be autonomous in relation to their environments (Schwartz & Okita, 2004).…”

Section: Perspectives On Human Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Shared Epistemic Agency: An Empirical Study of an Emergent Construct

Damşa

Kirschner

Andriessen

et al. 2010

Journal of the Learning Sciences

180

157

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…20 This characterization is very similar to what Stewart Cohen (1986) calls an intersubjectively evident defeater. 21 For other cases of this sort, see Reed (2001). 22 I discuss factual defeaters in note 9.…”

Section: IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection

Lackey

2005

Philos Stud

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One of the central problems afflicting reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is the apparent fact that infants and small children are not cognitively capable of having the inductively based positive reasons required by this view. Since non-reductionism does not impose a requirement of this sort, it is thought to avoid this problem and is therefore taken to have a significant advantage over reductionism. In this paper, however, I argue that if this objection undermines reductionism, then a variant of it similarly undermines non-reductionism. Thus, considerations about the cognitive capacities of infants and small children do not effectively discriminate between these two competing theories of testimonial justification.

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“…According to the deontological conception of justification justified belief is responsible belief of an agent obeying certain epistemic obligations (Steup ). Virtue epistemologists hold that knowledge is success through abilities (Reed , Sosa , , Greco ), and it is short step from there to hold that abilities are exercised by agents . Cognitive decision theory takes the pursuit of truth as a goal for which agents, individual or collective, can take rational decisions and revise their beliefs (Levi , Rott ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Epistemic Agency Possible?

Engel

2013

Philosophical Issues

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There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions. The main differences are that we cannot act for the wrong reasons although we can believe for the wrong reasons, and that reasons for beliefs are exclusive in a sense in which our reasons for actions are not. Epistemic agency is possible in the weak sense that we can be active, but not in the strong one in which we could have some elbow room for our epistemic reasons in reasoning leading to beliefs and other epistemic states.

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Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues

Cited by 15 publications

References 18 publications

Shared Epistemic Agency: An Empirical Study of an Emergent Construct

Shared Epistemic Agency: An Empirical Study of an Emergent Construct

Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection

Is Epistemic Agency Possible?

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