Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia

Abstract

In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated and systematized delusions in schizophrenia are typically false and exemplify failures of rationality and self-knowledge. Empirical studies suggest that they may have psychological benefits by relieving anxiety and enhancing meaningfulness. Moreover, these delusions have been considered as adaptive in virtue of the fact that they enable automated learning to resume after a significant disruption caused by incorrect prediction-error signalling. I argue that such psychological benefits and adaptive features also have positive epistemic consequences. More precisely, delusions can be a means to restoring epistemic functionality in agents who are overwhelmed by hypersalient experiences in the prodromal stage of psychosis. The analysis leads to a more complex view of the epistemic status of delusions than is found in the contemporary philosophical literature and has some implications for clinical practice. 1 Introduction2 Types of Delusions3 What Is Wrong with Elaborated and Systematized Delusions?4 Finding Life Meaningful5 Learning Resumed6 Epistemic Innocence7 Epistemic Benefit8 No Alternatives9 Conclusions and Implications

Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias

“…Bortolotti (2015a) introduces the notion of epistemic innocence through a comparison with the justificationdefence in UK and US law. A justification-defence is used to establish the innocence of an individual by showing that their act did not constitute an offence under the circumstances in which it was performed.…”

“…A subset of epistemically innocent cognitions are the lesser of two epistemic evils; while they are faulty because they bring epistemic costs, they lead to the avoidance of more substantial epistemic costs associated with cognitions that lack their faults (Bortolotti 2015a). In addition to showing that cognitions that fail to reflect social inequalities can be epistemically innocent, I aim to show that the same cognitions often belong to the subset of epistemically innocent cognitions that are the lesser of two epistemic evils.…”

“…In previous discussions of epistemic costs and benefits, a consequentialist approach has been taken (Bortolotti 2015a; arguably also Gendler 2011) and a cognition is viewed as epistemically good if it leads to positive consequences from an epistemic perspective while something is viewed as epistemically bad if it leads to negative consequences. I too focus on consequences, arguing that there are positive consequences that follow from failing to reflect some social realities in our judgements: an agent becomes disposed to respond in ways that increase the chance that they will obtain true beliefs and become disposed to form beliefs that are more consistent with and better supported by the evidence available to them.…”

“…To articulate this idea, I utilise the notion of epistemic innocence that has been introduced by Bortolotti (2015aBortolotti ( , 2015b and Sullivan-Bissett (2015) (see also Letheby 2016). A cognition is epistemically innocent if it has obvious epistemic costs but also brings significant epistemic benefits that could not have been gained in the absence of the costly cognition.…”

Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs

“…Examples of epistemically innocent beliefs are motivated delusions (Bortolotti 2015), delusions in schizophrenia (Bortolotti 2016), delusions in depression (Antrobus and Bortolotti 2016), confabulated explanations of actions driven by implicit bias (Sullivan-Bissett 2015), mental states resulting from the use of psychedelic drugs (Letheby 2016), inaccurate social cognitions that represent the world as more equal than it is (Puddifoot 2017), and distorted memories in the clinical population (Bortolotti and Sullivan-Bissett forthcoming).…”