Epistemic blame

Boult, Cameron

doi:10.1111/phc3.12762

Cited by 19 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…See Boult (2020Boult ( , 2021a, Brown (2018), and Kauppinen (2018) on the nature of distinctive epistemic blame or criticism. See Boult (2021b) for a recent overview of the literature on epistemic blame. See Schmidt (2021) on how appealing to epistemic blame can help us make sense of a distinctively epistemic kind of normativity.…”

Section: Practical Reasons For Belief As State-reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

Schmidt

2021

Philos Stud

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It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states (new pragmatism); or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons (traditional pragmatism). I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go.

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Section: Practical Reasons For Belief As State-reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

Schmidt

2021

Philos Stud

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“…physicians, but also neighbors, teachers, parents, teammates, citizens, cashiers, and friends) to form and share true beliefs about lots of things (Goldberg 2018). If they do not do so, we blame them and hold them responsible (Boult 2021;Meylan 2017;Tollefsen 2017). These, and many other social roles, are "socially approved sources of information," that allow for an epistemic division of labor in epistemically interdependent communities (Goldberg 2011;Greco 2020).…”

Section: The Primary Epistemic Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Dependence, Cognitive Irrationality, and Epistemic Conflicts of Interests

Müller¹

2022

Logos &Amp; Episteme

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When an agent A depends on an agent B to promote one of A's epistemic goals, this will often involve B's forming and sharing of true beliefs. However, as is well documented in research on cognitive irrationality, agents are disposed to form and share false-but-useful beliefs in a lot of circumstances. The dependence relation is thus at risk of becoming negative: A might adopt false beliefs from B and thus be unable to promote their epistemic goal. I propose that we can employ the notion of an epistemic conflict of interest [ECOI] to capture the kinds of problems that epistemically interdependent agents face. Much like familiar cases of conflict of interests—e.g., related to government officials—in ECOI an agent is subject to a normatively primary interest—roughly to form and share true beliefs—that stands in conflict with normatively secondary interests. I focus on secondary interests documented in the aforementioned research on cognitive irrationality. The resulting framework addresses an explanatory gap in the literature on social epistemic norms by making explicit why there’s a need for these norms to regulate our epistemic lives. Lastly, I show how the ECOI-framework furthermore allows us to make sense of and amend norm regulation failures.

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“…The thought is that, in order to count as "criticism", the form of response at issue must somehow go beyond mere assessment vis-à-vis a standard. For instance, blaming someone is sometimes 17 Brown (2020), Boult (2020Boult ( , 2021aBoult ( , 2021bBoult ( , 2021c, Schmidt (2021).…”

Section: An Argument Against Minimalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I will (somewhat hesitantly 23 ) follow suit. Boult (2021a) identifies four recent proposals when it comes to the nature of epistemic blame. First, there is the emotion-based view.…”

Section: Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Against Evidential Minimalism

Buckley

2022

Episteme

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Evidence is often taken to be “normative” for doxastic agents. What accounts for the normativity of evidence? According to the view that I'll call “evidential minimalism”, there is a close connection between strong evidence for the truth of p and a normative reason to believe p: evidence is either itself a normative reason for belief, or evidence gives rise to such a reason when certain other minimal conditions are met. In this paper, I argue against evidential minimalism. I will argue that there are cases where: (i) an individual S possesses strong evidence E for the truth of p at time t, (ii) all other minimal conditions for the normativity of E are met at t, (iii) S doesn't believe p at t, yet (iv) S isn't open to any form of criticism on account of (i)–(iii) at t. I will then formulate a plausible linking claim connecting openness to criticism and the existence of normative reasons for belief. The minimalist can either accept or reject this linking claim. I will argue that, either way, the minimalist view falters.

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Epistemic blame

Cited by 19 publications

References 67 publications

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

Epistemic Dependence, Cognitive Irrationality, and Epistemic Conflicts of Interests

Against Evidential Minimalism

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