Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense

Abstract

Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subject's doubts about her cognitive faculties. But, he argues, subjects don't have such doubts, so epistemically circular beliefs are rarely called upon to play this role. Second, following Thomas Reid, Bergmann argues that we have noninferential, though epistemically circular, knowledge that our faculties are reliable. I argue, however, that Bergmann's view is undermined by doubts a subject should have and that there is no plausible explanation for how we can have noninferential knowledge that our faculties are reliable.

Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed

“…This should lead us, he thinks, to doubt the reliability of our faculties. To those anti-skeptics who protest that Reed 2006, p. 192. Reed makes it clear (2006) that he thinks these doubts we should have constitute normative defeaters for the belief that our faculties are reliable, which (according to the definition of 'normative defeater' he employs) implies that we should withhold or disbelieve the claim that our faculties are reliable.…”

Getting off the Wheel

“…Versions of arguments more or less like this one are identified, for example, by Cohen (, 309), Reed (), and Cling (, 112). It is perhaps most intuitive to put the argument, as we have put it, in terms of temporal priority, but the problem is really one of conceptual priority.…”

Socially Extended Knowledge

“…For various views of what I call psychological defeaters see, for example, BonJour ( and ), Nozick (), Pollock (), Goldman (), Plantinga (), Lackey (), Bergmann ( and 2004), and Reed ().…”

“…For discussions involving what I call normative defeaters, approached in a number of different ways, see BonJour ( and ), Goldman (), Fricker ( and ), Chisholm (), Burge ( and ), McDowell (), Audi ( and ), Williams (), Lackey (), BonJour and Sosa (), Hawthorne (), and Reed (). What all of these discussions have in common is simply the idea that evidence can defeat knowledge (justification) even when the subject does not form any corresponding doubts or beliefs from the evidence in question.…”