Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility

Almeida, Cláudio de

doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9923-7

Cited by 12 publications

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References 25 publications

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“…I read this and think ‘That's true of me’ and then in dawning realization of the horrible truth, finish my thought with ‘and I am an alcoholic!’ Could I not, in this fleeting instant of dawning awareness, sensibly come to know that I have the mistaken belief that I am not an alcoholic? See also de Almeida's anti‐incoherence : If one believes that p and also believes that not‐ p , then one knows neither, nor is one justified in believing either (de Almeida , 205). Suppose that I know that ( p & I believe that not‐ p ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Williams

2015

Philosophy Compass

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It is raining but you don't believe that it is raining. Imagine accepting this claim. Then you are committed to saying ‘It is raining but I don't believe that it is raining’. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to claim or assert, yet what you say might be true. It might be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to assert something about yourself that might be true of you? This is Moore's paradox as it occurs in speech. What is the source of the absurdity? And why does it strike us that a contradiction is somehow at work when there is no contradiction in the content of what is asserted? In Section 2, I describe Moore's formulation of the paradox and evaluate his own solutions. In Section 3, I discuss Wittgenstein's influence in solving the paradox. In Section 4, I discuss Shoemaker's priority thesis that once the absurdity in belief has been explained, then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. In Section 5, I discuss work on omissive and commissive Moore‐paradoxical assertions, i.e. those of the forms p & I don't believe that p and p & I believe that not‐p. In Section 6, I discuss work on assertions of the form p & I don't know that p.

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confidence: 99%

Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Williams

2015

Philosophy Compass

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“… See also de Almeida's anti‐incoherence : If one believes that p and also believes that not‐ p , then one knows neither, nor is one justified in believing either (de Almeida , 205). Suppose that I know that ( p & I believe that not‐ p ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey

Williams

2015

Philosophy Compass

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It is raining but you don't believe that it is raining. Imagine silently accepting this claim. Then you believe both that it is raining and that you don't believe that it is raining. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to believe, yet what you believe might be true. It might be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to believe something about yourself that might be true of you? This is Moore's paradox as it occurs in thought. Solving the paradox consists in explaining why such beliefs are absurd. I give a survey of some of the main explanations. I largely deal with explanations of the absurdity of ‘omissive’ beliefs with contents of the form p & I don't believe that p and of ‘commissive beliefs’ with contents of the form p & I believe that not‐p as well as beliefs with contents of the form p & I don't know that p.

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Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination

Almeida

2019

Synthese Library

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Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility

Cited by 12 publications

References 25 publications

Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey

Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination

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