Epistemic Collaborations: Distributed Cognition and Virtue Reliabilism

Abstract

Strong epistemic anti-individualism-i.e., the claim that knowledge can be irreducibly social-is increasingly debated within mainstream and social epistemology. Most existing approaches attempt to argue for the view on the basis of aggregative analyses, which focus on the way certain groups aggregate the epistemic attitudes of their members. Such approaches are well motivated, given that many groups to which we often ascribe group knowledge-such as juries and committees-operate in this way. Yet another way that group knowledge can be generated is on the basis of epistemic collaborations, such as scientific research teams and Transactive Memory Systems. To produce knowledge, epistemic collaborations rely heavily on the mutual interactions of their group members. This is a distinctive feature of epistemic collaborations that renders them resistant to aggregative analyses. To accommodate this kind of group knowledge, the paper combines virtue reliabilism with the hypothesis of distributed cognition in order to introduce the hybrid approach of distributed virtue reliabilism. On this view, (1) beliefs produced by epistemic collaborations entertain positive epistemic standing (i.e., they are both reliable and epistemically responsible) in virtue of the mutual interactions of their group members; (2) this positive epistemic standing is a collective property; (3) epistemic collaborations qualify as epistemic group agents; (4) collaborative knowledge is a special kind of group knowledge, motivating strong epistemic anti-individualism in a distinctive way. Keywords Group knowledge • Strong epistemic anti-individualism • The hypothesis of distributed cognition • Epistemic group agents • Distributed virtue reliabilism

Collaborative knowledge: Where the distributed and commitment models merge

“…To argue specifically for collaborative knowledge (as it might emerge, for example, on the basis of Scientific Research Teams and Transactive Memory Systems (TMSs)), I have also proposed (Palermos, 2020) a version of the distributed model that I call Distributed Virtue Reliabilism. And like Bird and de Ridder, I too have shied away from the commitment model.…”

“…Epistemic collaborations such as Scientific Research Teams (de Ridder, 2014;Giere, 2002aGiere, , 2002bGiere, , 2006Giere, , 2007Palermos, 2020), Intelligence Agencies, Transactive Memory Systems (Wegner, 1986;Wegner et al, 1985) and even Social Machines like Wikipedia (Palermos, 2017) are already powerful, social engines of knowledge production. Little doubt should there be, then, that, as time goes by, such collaboratively produced knowledge is bound to become increasingly important-especially if we factor in the rise of Web 2.0 and similar technologies.…”

“…Little doubt should there be, then, that, as time goes by, such collaboratively produced knowledge is bound to become increasingly important-especially if we factor in the rise of Web 2.0 and similar technologies. Besides its wide, practical importance, collaborative knowledge is also remarkable from a theoretical perspective: In several authors' minds (e.g., de Ridder, 2014;Giere, 2002aGiere, , 2002bGiere, , 2006Giere, , 2007Palermos, 2020), this special kind of knowledge is a paradigmatic case of a wider, and somewhat controversial, phenomenon usually referred to as collective knowledge-i.e., knowledge that is irreducibly social.…”

“…Earlier attempts to motivate this claim can be found in(Palermos, 2015;Palermos 2017;Palermos and Pritchard 2013;Palermos and Pritchard 2016) Palermos (2020). contains my most recent and developed defence of this idea.…”

Collective Virtue Epistemology and the Value of Identity Diversity

“…Of course, Sosa focuses on individual competence and while there are difficulties extending this model to groups, Kallestrup (2020) and Carter (forthcoming) have explored ways of doing so. Palermos (2020) offers an alternative virtue responsibilist model that can be used to account for a group's distinctive intellectual virtues. Focusing on cases of epistemic collaborations, Palermos argues that members' interactions can give rise to collective cognitive properties that influence the group's intellectual virtues.…”