Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics

Gillies, Anthony S.

doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00485.x

Cited by 114 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…(i) is supported by data like (9) and (14); (ii) is supported by the factivity of knowledge plus the idea, suggested by (8) and (15), that ¬φ ¬probablyφ; and (iii) is obvious. Or to put it differently, the properties are desiderata for our semantic theory because the following are desiderata: Yalcin [35] notes that it is difficult to see how to reconcile (i )-(iii ) with possible worlds truth-conditions for probablyφ-sentences.…”

Section: Knowledge Operators In Mt Inferencesmentioning

confidence: 66%

“…8 Meanwhile, let us agree wholeheartedly that MT is valid, except for when it is not. 9 Turn now to the second reply, that the context-sensitivity of likely is what generates the illusion of a counterexample. Now there is no question that probability operators exhibit context-sensitivity.…”

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Or to put essentially the same thought in less loaded terms, the idea is that the likely in (P1) is in some sense semantically evaluated with respect to more 7 One valid instance occurred in the first paragraph of this paper, when I concluded that MT is not generally valid. 8 See, inter alia, [9,10,15,30,35,37] for relevant work and the appendix for explicit examples. 9 Could one retreat to the claim that MT should be construed as a generalization only about bare conditionals?…”

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…8 See, inter alia, [9,10,15,30,35,37] for relevant work and the appendix for explicit examples. 9 Could one retreat to the claim that MT should be construed as a generalization only about bare conditionals? This would leave out valid patterns that seem to be instances of MT: for example (where '♦' corresponds to epistemic possibility): 'If φ, then ♦ψ; ¬♦ψ; therefore ¬φ.…”

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Counterexample to Modus Tollens

Yalcin

2012

J Philos Logic

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This paper defends a counterexample to Modus Tollens, and uses it to draw some conclusions about the logic and semantics of indicative conditionals and probability operators in natural language. Along the way we investigate some of the interactions of these expressions with knows, and we call into question the thesis that all knowledge ascriptions have truthconditions. A probabilistic dynamic semantics for probability operators, conditionals, and acceptance attitudes is developed around the idea of representing the common ground of a conversation as a set of probability spaces.

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Section: Knowledge Operators In Mt Inferencesmentioning

confidence: 66%

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Counterexample to Modus Tollens

Yalcin

2012

J Philos Logic

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“…For more on context-dependent strictness (of different flavors) see, e.g., Veltman 1985, von Fintel 1998a, and Gillies 2004, 2007. 23 Thus, given well-behavedness (Definition 3.2), explaining Fact 2 is easy for widescoping egalitarians: if p q is equivalent to must (p ⊃ q) which, given well-behavedness, is equivalent to must must (p ⊃ q).…”

Section: Iffinessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Iffiness

Gillies

2010

S&P

Self Cite

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How do ordinary indicative conditionals manage to convey conditional information, information about what might or must be if such-and-such is or turns out to be the case? An old school thesis is that they do this by expressing something iffy: ordinary indicatives express a two-place conditional operator and that is how they convey conditional information. How indicatives interact with epistemic modals seems to be an argument against iffiness and for the new school thesis that if -clauses are merely devices for restricting the domains of other operators. I will make the trouble both clear and general, and then explore a way out for fans of iffiness. Keywords

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Counterfactuals

Arregui¹

2020

The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Semantics

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Counterfactuals sit at the crossroads of a wide set of theoretical interests in linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. Current linguistic debates on counterfactuals address problems in compositionality and the syntax–semantics interface, theories of context change, crosslinguistic variation in the construction of modal meanings, presupposition projection, scalar implicatures, and the interaction between temporal meanings and modal meanings, among other things. This chapter offers a brief overview of some of the central debates in the linguistic literature. The aim is to provide the reader with a preliminary panorama and a starting point for later excursions. The chapter offers a discussion of the criteria called upon to identify counterfactuals, a brief review of some aspects of their logic, and an overview of foundational theoretical proposals in the field.

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Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics

Cited by 114 publications

References 28 publications

A Counterexample to Modus Tollens

A Counterexample to Modus Tollens

Iffiness

Counterfactuals

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