Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem

Abstract

The paper critically examines an objection to epistemic contextualism recently developed by Elke Brendel and Peter Baumann, according to which it is impossible for the contextualist to know consistently that his theory is true. I first present an outline of contextualism and its reaction to scepticism. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise are explored. Finally, it will be argued that contextualism does not fulfil these minimal conditions. It will be shown that the contrary view is based on a misunderstanding of what contextualists are claiming.

On the Knowability of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. Montminy and W. Skolits

“…Similar arguments can be found in Williamson (2001), Brendel (2003Brendel ( , 2005Brendel ( , 2007Brendel ( , 2009, Wright (2005) and Jäger (2012). 6 For precise formulations of the contextualists' versions of the factivity and closure principles, see Freitag (2011Freitag ( , 2012 and Asheld (2013). 7 Proposition (4) below contradicts (2), but follows, given the mentioned principles, from (3):…”

“…As (KP) states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise, there remains only a single question to be answered: Does epistemic contextualism meet condition (KP)? As I have argued in my 2011, 2012, 2013a and 2013b, (MEC) is close to a faithful rendering of the generic form of epistemic contextualism (assuming it to focus on the two standards H and L; 𝔖 is the set of subjects): 11 (MEC) ∃s∈𝔖 ∃p∈𝔓: ◊(K L (s, p) ∧ ¬K H (s, p)).…”

“…For a precise derivation, seeFreitag (2011). 9 In the interest of readability, I will sometimes omit relativizing the knowability problem, and the corresponding knowledge claims, to high standards.…”

“…But they remain, as contextualists, neutral with regard to the truth of high-standard scepticism. For some discussions of the contextualist dialectics with respect to scepticism, seeFreitag (2011Freitag ( , 2012Freitag ( , 2013a.o n t h e k n owa b i l i t y o f e p i st e m i c c o n t ex t u a l i s m e pi ste m e vo l um e 12-3…”

“…21 Epistemic invariantism is best understood as the negation of epistemic contextualism. For a discussion, seeFreitag (2011).o n t h e k n owa b i l i t y o f e p i st e m i c c o n t ex t u a l i s m e pi ste m e vo l um e 12-3…”