Epistemic Expansions

Carr, Jennifer Rose

doi:10.11612/resphil.2015.92.2.4

Cited by 23 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Carr draws out unexpected and apparently unappealing consequences of this position. The theorem that follows (Theorem ) is simply a generalization of the central observations in (Carr, , Sections –3.5). To state it, we require some terminology.…”

Section: Carr On Epistemic Utility Theorymentioning

confidence: 89%

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The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X

Pettigrew

2016

Nous

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Consider Phoebe and Daphne. Phoebe has credences in 1 million propositions. Daphne, on the other hand, has credences in all of these propositions, but she's also got credences in 999 million other propositions. Phoebe's credences are all very accurate. Each of Daphne's credences, in contrast, are not very accurate at all; each is a little more accurate than it is inaccurate, but not by much. Whose doxastic state is better, Phoebe's or Daphne's? It is clear that this question is analogous to a question that has exercised ethicists over the past thirty years. How do we weigh a population consisting of some number of exceptionally happy and satisfied individuals against another population consisting of a much greater number of people whose lives are only just worth living? This is the question that occasions population ethics. In this paper, I go in search of the correct population ethics for credal states.

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Section: Carr On Epistemic Utility Theorymentioning

confidence: 89%

“…I am not the first to embark on this search. Jennifer Carr () has already furnished us with a host of valuable insights about the consequences of certain initially tempting orderings of credal states by their epistemic goodness. I begin in this paper by considering these insights and expanding on them.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X

Pettigrew

2016

Nous

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“…Similarly, the credal states of ordinary people do not contain credences about all propositions (Carr , Pettigrew ). For example, philosophy often introduces us to new questions, questions whose answers we had just never considered before, or whose answers we did not have the conceptual apparatus to entertain at all.…”

Section: The Epistemic Repugnant Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If accurate credences are good, then prima facie more of them are better. As Jennifer Carr () points out, this leads to the epistemic repugnant conclusion (ERC): the conclusion that, for any seemingly good (finite) credal state, there is a better (finite) state containing credences that are no more than minimally accurate (see also Pettigrew ). Since I will be talking a lot about the ERC, it'll help to have labels to make its parts easier to refer to.…”

Section: The Epistemic Repugnant Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Repugnant Accuracy

Talbot

2017

Nous

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Accuracy‐first epistemology is an approach to formal epistemology which takes accuracy to be a measure of epistemic utility and attempts to vindicate norms of epistemic rationality by showing how conformity with them is beneficial. If accuracy‐first epistemology can actually vindicate any epistemic norms, it must adopt a plausible account of epistemic value. Any such account must avoid the epistemic version of Derek Parfit's “repugnant conclusion.” I argue that the only plausible way of doing so is to say that accurate credences in certain propositions have no, or almost no, epistemic value. I prove that this is incompatible with standard accuracy‐first arguments for probabilism, and argue that there is no way for accuracy‐first epistemology to show that all credences of all agents should be coherent.

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Transformative Experiences

Arvan¹

2020

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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Transformative experiences are experiential states that radically alter a person in some way, such as what the person can know or understand, their core values or preferences, their overall outlook on the world, and so on. Notable historical examples plausibly include the Apostle Paul's epiphany and sudden conversion to Christianity on the road to Damascus, St. Augustine's moral and spiritual transformation after the death of a close friend, and similar transformations by the Buddha and Muhammed. Such experiences have been argued to pose philosophical challenges for rational choice, as it appears unclear how one can make rational life‐choices about experiences one does not understand or which otherwise fundamentally transform oneself or one's values. Some theorists argue that rational choices involving transformative experiences are impossible. Others argue that transformative experiences instead pose a challenge to making choices that are both rational and authentic. Others still are unconvinced that transformative experiences pose any serious or unique problems to rational choice, contending that the problems they present are either exaggerated or reducible to problems unrelated to transformative experience. Finally, many solutions have been advanced for resolving the problems that transformative experiences are alleged to pose, including that transformative experiences can be chosen for their own sake, chosen on the basis of objective evidence such as statistics and testimony, chosen on the basis of imaginative comparison to relevantly similar past experiences, or, alternatively, be rationally grappled with by the development of internal mastery such as personal resilience or through moral behavior.

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Epistemic Expansions

Cited by 23 publications

References 15 publications

The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X

The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X

Repugnant Accuracy

Transformative Experiences

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