Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games

Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games

“…Reny 1992, Figure 3. As is well known, strong rationalizability (Pearce 1984, Battigalli 1997) 20 and backward induction yield the same path, (O a ), but have very di¤erent o¤-path behavioral implications: for Bob, the unique strongly rationalizable behavior is I b :o b , while backward induction yields O b :o b . We can formally interpret the di¤erence as the result of di¤erent hypotheses about how players revise their beliefs about the plans, or intentions, of co-players.…”

Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory

“…We now discuss also a trust game form G 6 . 21 Assume that 1 = 0 and 2 > 0 to get the p-game G 6 , displayed alongside, where ^ 1 = E[ 1 ; 1 ] 2 [0; 10] denotes 1's expected payo¤. 22 [G 6 and G 6 ]…”

Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies

“…In particular, this implies that, for any history h 2 H, if there is a pro…le of information types, strategies, and beliefs of the coplayers ( i ; s i ; i ) such that the strategies s i are consistent with h and are best replies 18 to the beliefs i given i , then it is possible for i, upon observing h, to believe that the coplayers are rational, because there is a pro…le of epistemic types t i such that ( i ; s i ; t i ) satis…es rationality and is consistent with h. This is a key feature of the analysis of forward-induction reasoning of BS (2002,2007), which we extend here. 19…”

“…The formal de…nition of best reply is given below 19. Battigalli and Friedenberg (2012) analyze forward-induction reasoning when contextual assumptions rule out completeness.…”