Epistemic Games in Modal Logic: Joint Actions, Knowledge and Preferences All Together

Lorini, Emiliano; Schwarzentruber, François; Herzig, Andreas

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04893-7_17

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…What follows here has strong resemblances to earlier work by a number of authors, including (Herzig and Lorini 2010;Balbiani et al 2008;Lorini 2010;Lorini et al 2009). 13 One can also have more abstract worlds in so-called 'models of games', as is usual in epistemic game theory, see (Aumann 1999)-but this generality is not needed in what follows.…”

Section: Modal Logic Of Matrix Gamessupporting

confidence: 81%

Connecting Logics of Choice and Change

Benthem

Pacuit

2014

Outstanding Contributions to Logic

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This chapter is an attempt at clarifying the current scene of sometimes competing action logics, looking for compatibilities and convergences. Current paradigms for deliberate action fall into two broad families: dynamic logics of events, and STIT logics of achieving specified effects. We compare the two frameworks, and show how they can be related technically by embedding basic STIT into a modal logic of matrix games. Amongst various things, this analysis shows how the attractive principle of independence of agents' actions in STIT might actually be a source of high complexity in the total action logic. Our main point, however, is the compatibility of dynamic logics with explicit events and STIT logics based on a notion that we call 'control'-and we present a new system of dynamic-epistemic logic with control that has both. Finally, we discuss how dynamic logic and STIT face similar issues when including further crucial aspects of agency such as knowledge, preference, strategic behavior, and explicit acts of choice and deliberation.

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Section: Modal Logic Of Matrix Gamessupporting

confidence: 81%

Connecting Logics of Choice and Change

Benthem

Pacuit

2014

Outstanding Contributions to Logic

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show abstract

“…What follows here has strong resemblances to earlier work by a number of authors, including (Herzig and Lorini 2010;Lorini 2010;Lorini et al 2009). 13 One can also have more abstract worlds in so-called 'models of games', as is usual in epistemic game theory, see (Aumann 1999)-but this generality is not needed in what follows.…”

Section: Modal Logic Of Matrix Gamessupporting

confidence: 59%

Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action

Müller¹

2014

Outstanding Contributions to Logic

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“…A logical analysis of this type of information change uses modalities [⇑ i ϕ]ψ meaning "after i's radical upgrade of ϕ, ψ is true", interpreted as follows: 26 Here is how belief revision under soft information can be treated: 25 The most general dynamic point is this: "Information update is model transformation". 26 Conservative upgrade is the special case of radical upgrade with the modal formula best i (ϕ, w) :…”

Section: Soft Information and Soft Announcementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…26 Conservative upgrade is the special case of radical upgrade with the modal formula best i (ϕ, w) :…”

Section: Soft Information and Soft Announcementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction

Benthem

Pacuit

Roy

2011

Games

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Logic and game theory have had a few decades of contacts by now, with the classical results of epistemic game theory as major high-lights. In this paper, we emphasize a recent new perspective toward “logical dynamics”, designing logical systems that focus on the actions that change information, preference, and other driving forces of agency. We show how this dynamic turn works out for games, drawing on some recent advances in the literature. Our key examples are the long-term dynamics of information exchange, as well as the much-discussed issue of extensive game rationality. Our paper also proposes a new broader interpretation of what is happening here. The combination of logic and game theory provides a fine-grained perspective on information and interaction dynamics, and we are witnessing the birth of something new which is not just logic, nor just game theory, but rather a Theory of Play

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Epistemic Games in Modal Logic: Joint Actions, Knowledge and Preferences All Together

Cited by 6 publications

References 16 publications

Connecting Logics of Choice and Change

Connecting Logics of Choice and Change

Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action

Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction

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