Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation

Piovarchy, Adam; Siskind, Scott

doi:10.1007/s11098-023-01993-9

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 62 publications

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“…a measure of how well an entity (e.g. person, community, nation) is functioning with regard to various epistemic goods or ideals" (Piovarchy and Siskind, 2023). It is obvious that epistemic health is critical to the research enterprise and all within the research ecosystem would do well in staying epistemically healthy.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deficient epistemic virtues and prevalence of epistemic vices as precursors to transgressions in research misconduct

Tang

2024

Research Ethics

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Scientific research is supposed to acquire or generate knowledge, but such a purpose would be severely undermined by instances of research misconduct (RM) and questionable research practices (QRP). RM and QRP are often framed in terms of moral transgressions by individuals (bad apples) whose aberrant acts could be made conducive by shortcomings in regulatory measures of organizations or institutions (bad barrels). This notion presupposes, to an extent, that the erring parties know exactly what they are doing is wrong and morally culpable, but had nonetheless proceeded to commit wrongful acts. However, a confession of intent to deceived is often not readily admitted by perpetrators of RM. I posit that beyond the simplistic notion of conscious moral transgression, deficits in epistemic virtues and/or the prevalence of epistemic vices have important roles to play in initiating and driving RM/QRP. For the individual perpetrator, deficits in epistemic virtues could lead to or amplify errors in one’s desperate attempt to be accomplished or to excel, and pushes one across the ethical line or down the slippery slope of misconduct. Likewise, a lack of epistemic virtue within perpetrators’ institution or organization could make it conducive for deceitful acts and suppress indications and warning signs for the former. Furthermore, epistemic vices exhibited by reviewers, editors and journals could also promote RM/QRP. In this view, epistemic failings, rather than widespread moral deficiencies of individuals within the research ecosystem, may underlie the prevalence of RM/QRP.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deficient epistemic virtues and prevalence of epistemic vices as precursors to transgressions in research misconduct

Tang

2024

Research Ethics

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Epistemic Hypocrisy and Standing to Blame

Piovarchy

2024

Erkenn

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This paper considers the possibility that ‘epistemic hypocrisy’ could be relevant to our blaming practices. It argues that agents who culpably violate an epistemic norm can lack the standing to blame other agents who culpably violate similar norms. After disentangling our criticism of epistemic hypocrites from various other fitting responses, and the different ways some norms can bear on the legitimacy of our blame, I argue that a commitment account of standing to blame allows us to understand our objections to epistemic hypocrisy. Agents lack the epistemic standing to blame when they are not sufficiently committed to the epistemic norms they are blaming others for violating. This not only gives us a convincing account of epistemic standing to blame, it leaves us with a unified account of moral and epistemic standing.

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Epistemic Health, Epistemic Immunity and Epistemic Inoculation

Cited by 2 publications

References 62 publications

Deficient epistemic virtues and prevalence of epistemic vices as precursors to transgressions in research misconduct

Deficient epistemic virtues and prevalence of epistemic vices as precursors to transgressions in research misconduct

Epistemic Hypocrisy and Standing to Blame

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