Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions

Abstract

Epistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the socalled bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. In this paper, I will defend invariantism against this challenge by advocating the following, somewhat deationary account of the bank case intuitions: Readers of the bank cases assign different truth-values to the knowledge claims in the bank cases because they interpret these scenarios such that the epistemic position of the subject in question differs between the high and the low standards case. To substantiate this account, I will argue, rst, that the bank cases are underspecied even with respect to features that should uncontroversially be relevant for the epistemic position of the subject in question. Second, I will argue that readers of the bank cases will ll in these features differently in the low and the high standards case. In particular, I will argue that there is a variety of reasons to think that the fact that an error-possibility is mentioned in the high standards case will lead readers to assume that this error-possibility is supposed to be likely in the high standards case.

Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

“…That being said, our findings also provide reasons to be cautious when it comes to drawing conclusions from laypeople's responses to surveys (for similar worries concerning experimental epistemology, see e.g. Dinges, 2016;Gerken, 2018;Nagel, 2010;Nagel, Juan & Mar, 2013).…”

Assertion of Knowledge

“…Craig asks us to consider this question first "at its most subjective": "...I am seeking information as to whether or not p, and hence want an informant who is satisfactory for my purposes, here and now, with my present beliefs and capacities for receiving information. I am concerned, in other words, that as well as [ (0) 27 And while there may be concerns about the design and presentation of some of the relevant cases; see Dinges (2016), e.g. 28 Another important instance is the ascription of knowledge to groups (Lackey 2012).…”