Epistemic justification and epistemic luck

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

2020

mentioning

confidence: 89%

“… For some example in ethics, see Levy (2011) and Williams and Nagel (1976). For some examples in epistemology, see de Grefte (2018), Goldberg (2015) and Pritchard (2005). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

2020

“…This kind of luck is called veritic luck, which roughly amounts to the following (cf. de Grefte, 2018, p. 3824):

s

's belief that

p

is true, but the belief‐forming method that generated

s

's belief that

p

could very easily have produced a false belief.…”

Section: The Causal Theory Of Knowledge and Problems With Luckmentioning

confidence: 99%

The causal theory of knowledge revisited: An interventionist approach

Gebharter

2021

Ratio

Goldman proposed that a subject s knows p if and only if p is appropriately causally connected to s's believing p. He later on abandoned this theory. The main objection to the theory is that the causal connection required by Goldman is compatible with certain problematic forms of luck. In this paper we argue that Goldman's causal theory of knowledge can overcome the luck problem if causation is understood along interventionist lines. We also show that the modified theory leads to the correct results in contexts involving other prominent forms of epistemic luck and compare it with other accounts on the market.

“…3 Second, I examine two consequences of the points I make in this paper for epistemology specifically. 1 For some examples in epistemology, see Pritchard 2005;de Grefte 2018. For examples in ethics, see Levy 2011;Williams and Nagel 1976.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck

2019

Metaphilosophy

Self Cite

This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification.