Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk

Navarro, José Luis Martín

doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00387-9

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Consider "You are at risk of finding the love of your life." If 3 But see Navarro (2023) for an explicit argument against this view.…”

Section: Negative Valencementioning

confidence: 99%

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Mitova

2023

Metaphilosophy

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Epistemic risk is of central importance to epistemology nowadays: one common way in which a belief can fail to be knowledge is by being formed in an epistemically risky way, that is, a way that makes it true by luck. Recently, epistemologists have been expanding this rather narrow conception of risk in every direction, except arguably the most obvious one—to enable it to accommodate the increasingly commonplace thought that knowledge has an irreducibly social dimension. This paper fills this lacuna by bringing issues of epistemic injustice to bear on epistemic risk. In particular, it draws on the phenomenon of white ignorance, to sketch a more social notion of epistemic risk, on which the interests of one's epistemic community partly determine whether a belief‐forming procedure is epistemically risky.

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“…Consider "You are at risk of finding the love of your life." If 3 But see Navarro (2023) for an explicit argument against this view.…”

Section: Negative Valencementioning

confidence: 99%

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Mitova

2023

Metaphilosophy

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“…Science calls them risks. Recently, risk is rarely understood as an action in the hope of good luck, to get a positive and partly unexpected result [1]. Risk is now considered as an alarming uncertainty, as a danger.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal mechanism of protection from social risks: a value-based approach

Fedorova

Istomina

2022

SHS Web Conf.

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Protecting people from social risks is an important task for any state and society. Such protection is complex; it combines organizational measures, financial resources, and law. They form a united system, which we call the social risk management system. This system is based on a legal mechanism. Its social value consists in the fact that different branches of law make it possible to guarantee protection at different stages of the risk dynamics. The right also allows an individual to apply for protection, including to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. Using the example of protection from social risks associated with family responsibilities, the authors show the functioning of the legal mechanism for managing social risks and its importance.

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“…Doy aquí por sentado que un juicio de alto riesgo epistémico, al ser ex ante, puede seguir siendo acertado aunque ese riesgo no llegue a materializarse(Navarro 2021). En nuestro ejemplo, Green podría acertar en términos de fiabilidad al considerar arriesgado (ex ante) creer el testimonio de Marge, por mucho que se demuestre (ex post) que ella llevaba la razón.…”

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Reivindicaciones del crédito epistémico en el contexto social

Navarro

2022

quadfia

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Claims of epistemic credit in social context Resumen: En este ensayo explico la propuesta fundamental de Conocimiento expropiado (Broncano 2020) en el marco agencial y fiabilista que asume el autor. A continuación, me centro en su análisis de las situaciones de injusticia testimonial, contraponiendo los caminos seguidos por Miranda Fricker (enfocado en el prejuicio del intercambio testimonial) y Broncano (enfocado en el desajuste estructural). Tras señalar las deficiencias de cada modelo, apunto una propuesta alternativa: la injusticia testimonial se produce cuando la atribución de credibilidad es efecto de un juicio identitario, ya sea este ajustado o no, con respecto al colectivo al que pertenece la testigo. Abstract: In this essay, I explain the main claim of Conocimiento expropiado (Broncano 2020) against the background of the agential and reliabilist framework that its author assumes. I then focus on his analysis of situations of testimonial injustice, opposing Miranda Fricker’s approach (focused on prejudice in testimonial exchanges) and Broncano’s one (focused on structural imbalances). By pointing out the shortcommings of both models, I skech an alternative proposal: testimonial injustice is produced when the credibility assessment results from an identity judgment, whether it is effectively appropriate regarding the collective or not. Palabras clave: Epistemología política, fiabilismo agencial, injusticia testimonial, credibilidad. Keywords: Political Epistemology, agent reliabilism, testimonial injustice, credibility.

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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk

Cited by 5 publications

References 56 publications

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Legal mechanism of protection from social risks: a value-based approach

Reivindicaciones del crédito epistémico en el contexto social

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