Epistemic network injustice

Abstract

To find out what is in one’s own best interest, it is helpful to ask one’s epistemic peers. However, identifying one’s epistemic peers is not a trivial task. I consider a stylized political setting, an electoral competition of ‘Masses’ and ‘Elites’. To succeed, the Masses need to know which alternative on offer is truly in their interest. To find out, the Masses can pool their privately held information in a pre-election ballot, provided that they can reliably find out with whom they should pool information. I investigate the process of finding the relevant peer group for information pooling by modelling this group formation process as dynamic network change. The simulations show that the Masses can succeed in finding the right peers, but they also suggest reasons why the Elites may often be more successful. This phenomenon generalizes to the notion of Epistemic Network Injustice. Such injustice arises when a subset of citizens is systematically deprived of connections to helpful epistemic peers, leading to their reduced political influence. Epistemic Network Injustice is a new form of epistemic injustice, related to but distinct from the notion introduced by Miranda Fricker.

Doing epistemic justice in sustainable development: Applying the philosophical concept of epistemic injustice to the real world

“…In the same Special Issue as Mitova, Smith and Archer (2020) own interests and make them heard' (Spiekermann, 2020, p. 99). Individuals suffer epistemic network injustice when they are members of 'crippled networks' (Spiekermann, 2020), related to Hardin's concept of 'crippled epistemologies' (Hardin, 2002).…”

“…Spiekermann (2020) identifies an additional epistemic injustice related to networks, namely ‘epistemic network injustice’ which arises when groups of individuals are not able to connect with peers, reducing their political influence. Epistemic network injustice recognizes that individuals are epistemically dependent on their peers and ‘only if one succeeds in finding one's true peers can one effectively identify one's own interests and make them heard’ (Spiekermann, 2020, p. 99). Individuals suffer epistemic network injustice when they are members of ‘crippled networks’ (Spiekermann, 2020), related to Hardin's concept of ‘crippled epistemologies’ (Hardin, 2002).…”

“…Epistemic network injustice recognizes that individuals are epistemically dependent on their peers and ‘only if one succeeds in finding one's true peers can one effectively identify one's own interests and make them heard’ (Spiekermann, 2020, p. 99). Individuals suffer epistemic network injustice when they are members of ‘crippled networks’ (Spiekermann, 2020), related to Hardin's concept of ‘crippled epistemologies’ (Hardin, 2002).…”

Democracy, epistemic agency, and AI: political epistemology in times of artificial intelligence

“…In addition, one could not only make links to the principles of freedom and autonomy but also to questions regarding justice and fairness, discrimination, bias, and so on. For example, one could use the bridge concept of ‘epistemic justice’ (see for example [ 20 ] or [ 44 ]) and related concepts such as ‘epistemic network injustice’ which concerns connections to like-minded people [ 50 ]: the opposite of epistemic bubbles, a total lack of what Spiekermann calls ‘epistemic solidarity’ (p. 98), is also politically problematic. Epistemic forms of exclusion and injustice are of course politically relevant and impact democracy.…”

Power obsessed

“…Is the reason they face no resistance because the bottom 99.9% are crippled by collective action problems associated with large groups (Olson 1965)? Perhaps it is difficult to identify group members, undermining the possibility of self-regulation (Ostrom 1990) and information pooling (Spiekermann 2020). Whatever the case may be, the upshot of RCPP, as I see it, is that collective action problems are what ultimately determine whether inequalities in resources translate into inequalities in governance.…”