Epistemic Norms for Public Political Arguments

Abstract

The aim of the article is to develop precise epistemic rules for good public political arguments, by which political measures in the broad sense are justified. By means of a theory of deliberative democracy, it is substantiated that the justification of a political measure consists in showing argumentatively that this measure most promotes the common good or is morally optimal. It is then discussed which argumentation-theoretical approaches are suitable for providing epistemically sound rules for arguments for such theses and for the associated premises, rules whose compliance implies the truth or acceptability of the thesis. Finally, on the basis of the most suitable approach, namely the epistemological one, such systems of rules for the required types of arguments are presented that fulfil the conditions mentioned.

Norms of Public Argumentation and the Ideals of Correctness and Participation

“…Specific epistemic norms, or criteria, are available for deductive (Feldman 1999;Lumer 2005), probabilistic (Lumer 2011), and practical argument forms, e.g., arguments addressing the justification of prudential value judgements (Feldman 1999;Lumer 2014). Heeding these epistemic norms generally improves a deliberating body's truth orientation, and thus the epistemic position from which public argumentation occurs.…”