Epistemic Partialism

Abstract

Most of us are partial to our friends and loved ones: we treat them with special care, and we feel justified in doing so. In recent years, the idea that good friends are also epistemically partial to one another has been popular. Being a good friend, so‐called epistemic partialists suggest, involves being positively biased towards one's friends – that is, involves thinking more highly of them than is warranted by the evidence. In this paper, I outline the concept of epistemic partiality and its relation to non‐epistemic partiality and explore some considerations that speak in favour of and against such partialism in friendships. I finish by suggesting some directions in which this debate could go next.

Against zetetic encroachment

“…That friendships call for certain blind spots in one's beliefs is commonly associated with the thesis of epistemic partialism. For a recent overview of that literature, see Mason (2023). However, while partialism is often spelled out in terms of a requirement to have false beliefs about one's friends, the above thesis only concerns reasons to lack certain beliefs.…”