Epistemic Self-Trust and Doxastic Disagreements

Peter, Fabienne

doi:10.1007/s10670-018-0004-x

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…In short, these views legitimize an egocentric bias (Wedgwood 2007). Relevant objections to this approach are offered in Peter (2019).…”

Section: Addressing the Central Question: Steadfast Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The epistemology of disagreement

Croce

2023

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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The epistemology of disagreement studies the epistemically relevant aspects of the interaction between parties who hold diverging opinions about a given subject matter. The central question that the epistemology of disagreement purports to answer is how the involved parties should resolve an instance of disagreement. Answers to this central question largely depend on the epistemic position of each party before disagreement occurs. Two parties are equally positioned from an epistemic standpoint – namely, they are epistemic peers – to the extent that they have roughly equal access to the evidence and comparable intellectual resources. When one party is epistemically better positioned than the other – that is, when one is an epistemic superior – it is widely agreed that this party should retain their belief while the other party – the epistemic inferior – should revise their opinion in the direction of what the epistemic superior believes. Addressing the central question is a complex task when the disagreeing parties are epistemic peers. Three main answers can be distinguished. Conciliatory answers mandate that both parties revise – i.e. lower their confidence in – their beliefs upon the occurrence of peer disagreement. Steadfast answers allow both parties to retain their respective beliefs, thereby committing them to demote the epistemic position of the interlocutor. The third group of answers suggests that the solution to peer disagreement depends on whether either party is highly justified in holding their belief. If either party is highly justified, then it is rational that this party retains its view. If neither party is highly justified, both should revise. The epistemology of disagreement addresses further important questions such as: whether the occurrence of disagreement opens the doors to scepticism and/or relativism; what the consequences of epistemic disagreement on intellectual character are; what laypeople should do when experts disagree with each other; and whether disagreement among groups can be treated in the same way as disagreement among individuals.

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“…In short, these views legitimize an egocentric bias (Wedgwood 2007). Relevant objections to this approach are offered in Peter (2019).…”

Section: Addressing the Central Question: Steadfast Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The epistemology of disagreement

Croce

2023

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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“…A related epistemic consideration is that the justifications provided have to be acceptable to those who ask for it. As Fabienne Peter puts it, if a policy is to be politically justified it must be justified to the citizens who are subject to it (Peter 2019). If there is no accessible reason available to them to accept some political decision, then we have some good reason to think that decision is not politically justified.…”

Section: Consequencementioning

confidence: 99%

Political Justificationism: A Casuistic Epistemology of Political Disagreement

Carlson¹

2020

Trames. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences

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The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper, drawing on Jennifer Lackey's justificationist approach and the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual epistemology of political disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement's scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether we should respond to that disagreement at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. Though some may argue that responding with policy is a practical consideration instead of an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to disagreements have an epistemic dimension to them that we should not ignore.

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“…SeePasnau (2015) andPeter (2019) for discussion relating to less standard conceptions of self-trust.24Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for their thoughtful suggestions on how to improve this paper, as well as the editors of the volume. For comments on earlier drafts and help developing the research from which this paper draws, thanks are owed to T. Ryan Byerly, Charlie Crerar, Paul Faulkner, Miranda Fricker, and Trystan Goetze, as well as to colleagues in the philosophy department at the University of…”

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confidence: 99%

Deep Disagreement, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Self-trust

Barker

2023

Episteme

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Sometimes we disagree because of fundamental differences in what we treat as reasons for belief. Such are ‘deep disagreements'. Amongst the questions we might ask about deep disagreement is the epistemic normative one: how ought one to respond to disagreement, when that disagreement is deep. This paper addresses that question. According to the position developed, how one ought to respond to deep disagreement depends upon two things: (i) Whether one remains, in the context of disagreement, permitted to trust oneself in following one's epistemic norms and in relation to that (ii) whether one has the shared stock of social-epistemic experiences with followers of one's rival's norms such that one could reasonably be expected to see their way of doing things as a genuine epistemic alternative to one's own. Section 1 introduces a model of deep disagreement such that deep disagreements occur when disputants disagree because they follow different epistemic norms. Section 2 surveys the possible theoretical stances to take towards the epistemic-normative question. Section 3 develops an account of what it is to follow an epistemic norm. Section 4 applies this conception of norm-following to the epistemic-normative question. Section 5 discusses two points of clarification.

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Epistemic Self-Trust and Doxastic Disagreements

Cited by 7 publications

References 28 publications

The epistemology of disagreement

The epistemology of disagreement

Political Justificationism: A Casuistic Epistemology of Political Disagreement

Deep Disagreement, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Self-trust

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