Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal

Abstract

What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer this question. Many construe epistemic trust in oneself as no more than reliance on our sub-personal cognitive faculties. Yet many accounts – often the same ones – construe epistemic trust in others as a normatively laden attitude directed at persons whom we expect to care about our epistemic needs. Is epistemic self-trust really so different from epistemic trust in others? I argue that it is not. We certainly do rely on our cognitive faculties to achieve epistemic ends; but I argue that we also have the normatively rich sort of epistemic trust in ourselves. Moreover, there is a theoretical need for this normatively rich notion of epistemic self-trust: positing it yields the best account of how we secure important epistemic goods, including knowledge and recognition as knowers. I argue this by giving an account of epistemic trust in others and showing that it can be generalized to epistemic trust in oneself.

Valuable and pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust1

“…Dormandy (2020) focuses on epistemic self‐trust and criticizes traditional accounts of epistemic self‐trust because they limit such self‐trust to reliance on one's capacities 2 . Instead, she suggests, epistemic self‐trust works more like interpersonal trust, it consists in trusting oneself, not just one's intellectual capacities.…”

“…Instead, she suggests, epistemic self‐trust works more like interpersonal trust, it consists in trusting oneself, not just one's intellectual capacities. Her contribution is relevant to this discussion of valuable (and pernicious) intellectual self‐trust because her alternative conception of self‐trust enables her to argue that epistemic self‐trust is a healthy relationship with oneself (Dormandy, 2020, p. 12). The value of a healthy relationship with oneself is not captured by the epistemically consequentialist or virtue‐theoretic framework.…”

“…In addition, it has been recognized as a socially, politically relevant category (El Kassar, 2020; Jones, 2012). Authors have since turned to defining individual intellectual self‐trust (Dormandy, 2020; El Kassar, 2020, 2021; Jones, 2012; Tanesini, 2021) and discussing the features of valuable and pernicious intellectual self‐trust (El Kassar, fthc; Leefmann, 2022; Tanesini, 2021). At the same time, political and social developments as well as the COVID‐19 pandemic have given collectives renewed attention within epistemology: group ignorance and group conspiracy belief are just two examples.…”

Social Exclusion, Epistemic Injustice, and Intellectual Self-Trust

“…To explore that relation between intellectual self-trust and social exclusion it will be helpful to first say a little more about the nature of intellectual self-trust. As the nature of intellectual self-trust has been and is still the object of lively philosophical discussion and because accounts of the concept differ in detail (Dormandy 2020;El Kassar 2020Fricker 2016;Jones 2012;Tanesini 2020;Zagzebski 2012), I will not try to defend any substantial account. Instead I will focus on a minimal conception of intellectual self-trust as an attitude a person takes towards her own capacities to form beliefs, to give reasons for beliefs, and to reach an understanding of the world.…”

“…(Foley 2001)) and thus, what I take to be the first condition of intellectual self-trust. Taking into account questions about the aptness of intellectual self-trust in various social contexts and social mechanisms that undermine epistemic self trust, more recent accounts have shown that self-trust, just like interpersonal trust, involves more than mere reliance, (for example see Dormandy 2020).…”