Epistemic values in the Burgess Shale debate

Baron, Christian

doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2009.09.008

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…After all, we are we are limited by epistemic implications of an incomplete and imperfect fossil record whose discoveries are often chance occurrences themselves (c.f. Baron, 2009). Nonetheless, I invoke mass extinctions with the intention of presenting the Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency in its strongest form.…”

Section: The Special Status Of Mass Extinctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Neo-Gouldian Argument for Evolutionary Contingency: Mass Extinctions

Wong¹

2022

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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The Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency found in Wonderful Life (1989) can be dissected into three premises: a palaeontological, a macroevolutionary, and a developmental. Discussions of evolutionary contingency have revolved primarily around the developmental. However, a shift in methodological practice and new palaeontological evidence subsequent to the book's publication appears to threaten the palaeontological premise that asserts high Cambrian disparity or, roughly, that morphological differences between the Cambrian species were high. This presents a prima facie problem: did the Cambrian consist of enough anatomical variety to fuel a different outcome upon a replay of the tape of life? I investigate the role that disparity plays in the Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency and conclude that the reduced disparity view does not undermine the argument, per se. As for the macroevolutionary premise, Gould never offered any explicit justification for the idea that species sorting was indiscriminate or 'lottery-like' (though he certainly gestured at it). Putting aside the exegetical, I consider certain empirical avenues for underwriting the macroevolutionary premise and argue that the most plausible route is to appeal to the special status of mass extinctions, a move that is not entirely unfamiliar to macro-evolutionists. That is -mass extinctions can be good sources of contingency due to their being 'chancy' in, at least, three respects. In sum, I update the palaeontological and macroevolutionary premises as to reconstrue the Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency in its strongest form. 1 Introduction 2 The Gouldian Argument for Evolutionary Contingency 2.1 The Palaeontological Premise 2.2 The Role of Disparity 2.3 The Macroevolutionary Premise 2.4 The Developmental Premise 3 Macroevolutionary Sampling: Biased or Unbiased? 4 The Special Status of Mass Extinctions 4.1 Low Probability of Occurrence 4.2 Random Survivorship Rules: Field of Bullets or Wanton? 4.3 Aftermath Effects: 'Random' Origination

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Section: The Special Status Of Mass Extinctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Neo-Gouldian Argument for Evolutionary Contingency: Mass Extinctions

Wong¹

2022

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…When the Cambridge team began their investigations the Burgess Shale fossils was dominated by the so-called British School of Carcinology (Schram, 1993;Baron, 2009), which by the 1960s and 1970s had achieved scientific hegemony in Anglo-Saxon arthropod research -and whose leading figure, Sidnie Milana Manton (1902Manton ( -1979, like Whittington and most of his associates working on the Burgess Shale material, was connected to Cambridge. Manton was known primarily as a functional morphologist, her claim to fame coming from her comprehensive work on the locomotive functions of arthropods, where she was considered the field's leading expert.…”

Section: Manton Anglo-saxon Arthropod Systematics and The Reconstrumentioning

confidence: 99%

A Web of Controversies: Complexity in the Burgess Shale Debate

Baron

2010

J Hist Biol

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Using the Burgess Shale controversies as a case-study, this paper argues that controversies within different domains may interact as to create a situation of "com- plicated intricacies," where the practicing scientist has to navigate through a context of multiple thought collectives. To some extent each of these collectives has its own dynamic complete with fairly negotiated standards for investigation and explanation, theoretical background assumptions and certain peculiarities of practice. But the intellectual development in one of these collectives may "spill over" having far reaching consequences for the treatment of apparently independent epistemic problems that are subject of investigation in other thought collectives. For the practicing scientist it is necessary to take this complex web of interactions into account in order to be able to navigate in such a situation. So far most studies of academic science have had a tendency to treat the practicing scientist as members of a single (enclosed) thought collective that stands intellectually isolated from other similar entities unless the discipline was in a state of crisis of paradigmatic proportions. The richness and complexity of Burgess Shale debate shows that this encapsulated kind of analysis is not enough.

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“…The way these factors were used to develop the contingency thesis as promoted by S. J. Gould (Blount, Lenski, and Losos 2018;McConwell 2019;Turner 2011;Dresow 2019;Beatty 2006aBeatty , 2006b) and the convergence thesis as promoted by S. Conway Morris, has also been researched. In addition, the debate between the two has been approached from different perspectives (Baron 2011;Bowler 1998;Baron 2009;Mcshea 1993). However, what is lacking is a parallel philosophical analysis of the core arguments each of them offered in support of their thesis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contingency and convergence in the theory of evolution: Stephen Jay Gould vs. Simon Conway Morris

Jeftić¹

2022

Belgrade Philosop Ann

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Debating the interpretation of the Burgess Shale fossil records, Stephen Jay Gould and Simon Conway Morris have formulated two conflicting theses regarding the nature of evolutionary processes. While Gould argued that evolution is essentially a contingent process whose outcomes are unpredictable, Conway Morris claimed that the omnipresence of convergence testifies that it is in fact deterministic, leading to predictable and inevitable outcomes. Their theses have been extensively researched from various perspectives. However, a systematic parallel analysis of the core arguments each of them offered in support of their thesis has been lacking. I argue Conway Morris has successfully exposed the core weaknesses of Gould's thesis and offered a comprehensive account in favor of the major role of convergence in evolutionary history. On the other hand, I will point out some of the weak points in the latter's arguments supporting the deterministic view of life's evolution. Although Conway Morris has been more successful in arguing for the deterministic nature of the evolutionary processes, both theses could be improved if their shortcomings are taken into consideration.

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Epistemic values in the Burgess Shale debate

Cited by 8 publications

References 24 publications

The Neo-Gouldian Argument for Evolutionary Contingency: Mass Extinctions

The Neo-Gouldian Argument for Evolutionary Contingency: Mass Extinctions

A Web of Controversies: Complexity in the Burgess Shale Debate

Contingency and convergence in the theory of evolution: Stephen Jay Gould vs. Simon Conway Morris

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