Epistemic Variantism and the Factivity of Knowledge

Freitag, Wolfgang M.

doi:10.1515/9783110329018.81

Cited by 1 publication

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“…As (KP) states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise, there remains only a single question to be answered: Does epistemic contextualism meet condition (KP)? As I have argued in my 2011, 2012, 2013a and 2013b, (MEC) is close to a faithful rendering of the generic form of epistemic contextualism (assuming it to focus on the two standards H and L; 𝔖 is the set of subjects): 11 (MEC) ∃s∈𝔖 ∃p∈𝔓: ◊(K L (s, p) ∧ ¬K H (s, p)).…”

Section: The Knowability Problem and Its Solutionmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…My own response (2011, 2012, 2013b) takes a radically different course. I deny that (1) and (2) are contextualist theses in the first place.…”

Section: The Knowability Problem and Its Solutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…10Since there is no mention of knowledge of varying standards, the knowability problem can be seen to be independent of questions of contextualism or variantism. I emphasize this point in Freitag (2012). …”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…6For precise formulations of the contextualists' versions of the factivity and closure principles, see Freitag (2011, 2012) and Ashfield (2013). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But they remain, as contextualists, neutral with regard to the truth of high-standard scepticism. For some discussions of the contextualist dialectics with respect to scepticism, see Freitag (2011, 2012, 2013a: 130–35).…”

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confidence: 99%

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On the Knowability of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. Montminy and W. Skolits

Freitag¹

2015

Episteme

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It has been frequently suggested that epistemic contextualists violate the knowledge norm of assertion; by its own lights contextualism cannot be known and hence not be knowingly stated. I have defended contextualists against this objection by showing that it rests on a misunderstanding of their commitments (Freitag 2011, 2012, 2013b). In M. Montminy's and W. Skolits' recent contribution to this journal (2014), their criticism of my solution forms the background against which the authors develop their own. The present reply ventures to demonstrate that their objections are ineffective, since they rest on a confusion of two different ways in which contextualism is unknowable. The precise nature of the original problem will be clarified and my solution briefly restated.

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