Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints

Moulin, Hervé; Laigret, Francois

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.002

Cited by 18 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Our model extends earlier work by Moulin and Laigret ( [14]) and Hougaard and Moulin ([9]), both in the deterministic case where all projects always work.…”

Section: Relation To the Literaturesupporting

confidence: 77%

“…In [14] each project is indispensable to at least one agent, so no project is redundant. One division method stands out, dubbed the Equal Need solution: it divides the cost of any project equally between all agents needing this project for service.…”

Section: Relation To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…As documented in the next Section, this "bare bones"approach to the division of costs is increasingly important in microeconomic distributive justice, because of the practical impossibility to measure bene…ts in terms of welfare and the fact that exogenous costs, not in ‡uenced by individual preferences, are often the norm (see e. g., [14] and references there). 2 We introduce a new dimension to the original model in [9] by assuming that items may fail, that they have limited reliability, and we show that this has a signi…cant impact on the de…nition of fairness.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sharing the cost of risky projects

Hougaard

Moulin

2017

Econ Theory

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Users share the cost of unreliable non rival projects (items). For instance, industry partners pay today for R&D that may or may not deliver a cure to some viruses, agents pay for the edges of a network that will cover their connectivity needs, but the edges may fail, etc.. Each user has a binary inelastic need that is served if and only if certain subsets of items are actually functioning. We ask how should the cost be divided when individual needs are heterogenous. We impose three powerful separability properties:Independence of Timing ensures that the cost shares computed ex ante are the expectation, over the random realization of the projects, of shares computed ex post. Cost Additivity together with Separability Across Projects ensure that the cost shares of an item depend only upon the service provided by that item for a given realization of all other items.Combining these with fair bounds on the liability of agents with more or less ‡exible needs, and of agents for whom an item is either indispensable or useless, we characterize two rules: the Ex Post Service rule is the expectation of the equal division of costs between the agents who end up served; the Needs Priority rule splits the cost …rst between those agents for whom an item is critical ex post, or if there are no such agents between those who end up being served.

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“…Our model extends earlier work by Moulin and Laigret ( [14]) and Hougaard and Moulin ([9]), both in the deterministic case where all projects always work.…”

Section: Relation To the Literaturesupporting

confidence: 77%

Section: Relation To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sharing the cost of risky projects

Hougaard

Moulin

2017

Econ Theory

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“…Second, to provide to the members the right incentives to remain in the alliance and to contribute to it. The properties discussed below, are usually discussed in cost/revenue sharing problems, with slightly different definitions (see for instance [7], [9], [11]). We select from the literature the ones that we believe are more relevant to our problem, argument on why they are relevant and formally define them.…”

Section: Desired Properties Of the Revenue Sharing Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revenue sharing in network utility maximization problems

2016

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Alliances arise in a wide variety of domains, when a group of countries, political parties, people or other entities agree to work together because of shared interests or aims. They make sense, if the output obtained is somehow better than the outcome of acting individually. Revenue or cost sharing is key when determining if individuals are better off by contributing to an alliance or not. In our alliance each member owns a unique resource -or set of resources-, which is given to the alliance . The alliance sells services, which are supported thanks to one or a set of these resources. We focus on alliances that sell services in such a way that the total revenue of the alliance is maximized. We show that this kind of problems can be modeled through a Network Utility Maximization problem. We subsequently explore the problem of revenue sharing among the members of the alliance. Such a problem is a complex one since the interests of all participants must be ensured and correct incentives must be provided. We formally formulate the members' interests through a set of properties the revenue sharing method should verify. We then discuss the existing methods for revenue sharing and conclude that none of them verify the needed properties for the case of a revenue maximizing alliance. We finally propose a revenue sharing method based on projecting the contributions of each member of the alliance into an economic stable set. Through an exhaustive simulative study we conclude that our method provides, in addition to economic stabil-I. Amigo, S.Vaton Institut Mines Telecom, Télécom Bretagne Technopole Brest-Iroise -CS 83818 29238 Brest Cedex 3, France Phone: (+33)(0)2 29 00 11 11 E-mail: {isabel.amigo,sandrine.vaton}@telecom-bretagne.eu P. Belzarena Facultad de Ingeniería, Universidad de la República Julio Herrera y Reissig 565 -C.P. 11300 Montevideo, Uruguay Phone: (+598) 2711 0974 E-mail: {belza,iamigo}@fing.edu.uy 2 I. Amigo, P. Belzarena, S. Vaton ity, fairness among members and the right incentives to them. Through our analysis Network Service Provider alliances, which sell quality-assured data transport services, are considered as an application example.

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“…There are many cost sharing problems involving two groups of agents in which each agent from the first group obtains services from some agents in the second group. And the total service costs incurred to the second group must be shared among the agents in the first group (see Moulin and Laigret [4]). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Museum Cost Sharing Problem

Wang¹

2011

AJOR

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Ginsburgh and Zang [1] consider a revenue sharing problem for the museum pass program, in which several museums jointly offer museum passes that allow visitors an unlimited access to participating museums in a certain period of time. We consider a cost sharing problem that can be regarded as the dual problem of the above revenue sharing problem. We assume that all museums are public goods and have various (e.g., service) costs. These costs must be shared by museum visitors. We propose a cost sharing method and provide an axiomatic characterization of the method. We then define a game for the problem and show that the cost sharing method is the Shapley value of the game. We also provide a comparative statics analysis for both the Shapley value of the museum pass game and the Shapley value for the cost sharing game when the number of museums and/or the number of visitors change.

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Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints

Cited by 18 publications

References 17 publications

Sharing the cost of risky projects

Sharing the cost of risky projects

Revenue sharing in network utility maximization problems

A Museum Cost Sharing Problem

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