Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality

Elford, Gideon

doi:10.1007/s10677-011-9331-6

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Its elimination entails an inequality in brute luck; the latter of which is unfair on the luck egalitarian view. But to say that brute luck equality is required by fairness is therefore simply to articulate the shape of the luck 7 It's worth noting that whilst luck egalitarianism is often formulated in terms of requiring brute luck equality, Elford (2013) has shown that there are some brute luck inequalities that luck egalitarianism does not have reason to object to. Elford's observations are, however, limited to noting that brute luck inequalities resulting from otheraffecting choices ought not to be judged unfair on luck egalitarian terms.…”

Section: Luck Egalitarianism and Fairness: Responding To Cohen's Chalmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Is Inequality Fair?

Elford

2018

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Recent literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism has suggested that an opposition to unchosen inequality on the grounds of unfairness is compatible with a range of accounts as to which inequalities are fair. I argue that forms of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism face a challenge in the construction of such accounts; namely to explain the fairness of such inequalities specifically, as opposed to their being merely justified in a broader sense. I illustrate the nature of this challenge through an interesting parallel with an issue in value theory in the form of the so-called 'wrong kind of reason' problem. Keywords Equality. Inequality. Fairness. Luck egalitarianism. Responsibility. Desert Over the past quarter of a century egalitarian theory has moved to interpret the value of equality in a way that takes account of the significance of responsibility (Dworkin 1981; Cohen 1989; Arneson 1989). A great number of the most prominent egalitarian positions have argued not for strict equality but in favour of an understanding of the value of equality under which people's choices make a difference to what they are owed. In taking such a position egalitarian authors have maintained that, far from being antithetical to one another, a proper understanding of equality entails rather than conflicts with considerations of responsibility, and commends rather than eschews certain inequalities, specifically those that in some way reflect people's responsible choices. Indeed, in what has increasingly become the paradigm reference point with which to trace the evolution of egalitarian ideas in this regard, Cohen (1989, 933) credits Ronald Dworkin with having Bperformed for egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: that of choice and responsibility.Ô ne of the stronger would-be anti-egalitarian objections to equality tout court appears to be one of fairness. It just wouldn't be fair, this line of thought runs, to demand equality between persons when some of those persons are hard-working and prudent whereas others are lazy or

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Section: Luck Egalitarianism and Fairness: Responding To Cohen's Chalmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Is Inequality Fair?

Elford

2018

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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“…Miller submits one reason in particular for this: that luck egalitarianism is ill-equipped to deal with other-affecting choices. This particular discussion is not addressed here but the thought has received some attention recently (Elford, 2013;Lazenby, 2009;Lippert-Rasmussen, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Luck Egalitarianism of G.A. Cohen - A Reply to David Miller

Albertsen

2017

Sats

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The late G.A. Cohen is routinely considered a founding father of luck egalitarianism, a prominent responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. David Miller argues that Cohen’s considered beliefs on distributive justice are not best understood as luck egalitarian. While the relationship between distributive justice and personal responsibility plays an important part in Cohen’s work, Miller maintains that it should be considered an isolated theme confined to Cohen’s exchange with Dworkin. We should not understand the view Cohen defends in this exchange as Cohen’s considered view. Accepting this thesis would change both our understanding of Cohen’s political philosophy and many recent luck egalitarian contributions. Miller’s argument offers an opportunity to reassess Cohen’s writings as a whole. Ultimately, however, the textual evidence against Miller’s argument is overwhelming. Cohen clearly considers the exchange with Dworkin to be about egalitarianism as such rather than about the best responsibility-sensitive version of egalitarianism. Furthermore, Cohen often offers luck egalitarian formulations of his own view outside of the exchange with Dworkin and uses luck egalitarianism as an independent yardstick for evaluating principles and distributions.

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“…En suma, existen dos problemas mayores que desde un igualitarismo relacional detectamos en el igualitarismo de la suerte: 1) un problema teórico-conceptual: la compensación individual por los efectos de la mala suerte entra en colisión con el supuesto básico de la capacidad de elección, habida cuenta de la interconexión e interrelación entre las decisiones de unos y el bienestar de los otros, esto es, el clásico problema del other affecting choice (Elford, 2013;Lazenby, 2010); y 2) un problema de implementación de las políticas públicas derivadas de este igualitarismo: la obsesiva pulsión taxonómica que llevaría a un tan impracticable (por burocrático) como indeseable (por estigmatizante) escrutinio vejatorio de las decisiones individuales.…”

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De la economía a la ética, ¿qué fue de la política? Para una teoría estructural de la igualdad

Máiz¹

2016

Rev. Estud. Polít.

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Revista de Estudios Políticos, 174, octubre/diciembre (2016), pp. 13-46 género y etnia, y exorbitantes ganancias no merecidas, derivadas de la especulación y las asimetrías estructurales de poder. La reorientación estructural que aquí se postula posee, más allá del plano teórico normativo, consecuencias de relieve para la agenda de las políticas públicas de predistribución y redistribución. Palabras claveIgualdad; mérito; responsabilidad; justicia; teoría política. AbstractThis paper develops a systematic critique of the individualistic shift in the contemporary political theory of equality. Uncritically indebted to a model of homo oeconomicus centred on the "merit" and "responsibility" of each citizen, this individualised model is inadequate in accounting for contemporary inequalities based on class, gender and ethnicity. The paper argues in favour of re-setting egalitarian theory from a structural and political rather than ethical perspective, with the aim of building new social and political relationships of self and mutual respect and non-domination. This is especially compelling in the current context of ecological crisis, increasing class inequality, strong gender disadvantage, and systematic expansion of income inequality, fuelled by privatization, speculation, profiting without producing, and structural power asymmetries. This structural reorientation of the political theory of egalitarianism implies not only changes in the realm of the theoretical focus on justice and equality, but also suggest major changes in the current agenda of public re-distribution and pre-distribution policies. KeywordsEquality; merit; responsibility; justice; political theory. DE LA ECONOMÍA A LA ÉTICA, ¿QUÉ FUE DE LA POLÍTICA? PARA UNA… 15 Revista de Estudios Políticos, 174, octubre/diciembre (2016), pp. 13-46 SUMARIO I. LOS LÍMITES TEÓRICOS DEL «MÉRITO» Y LA «RESPONSABILIDAD» COMO PRIN-CIPIOS DE JUSTICIA. II. EN DEFENSA DE UNA TEORÍA DEMOCRÁTICO-REPUBLI-CANA Y RELACIONAL DE LA IGUALDAD. III. CONCLUSIONES. Bibliografía.

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Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality

Cited by 9 publications

References 8 publications

When Is Inequality Fair?

When Is Inequality Fair?

The Luck Egalitarianism of G.A. Cohen - A Reply to David Miller

De la economía a la ética, ¿qué fue de la política? Para una teoría estructural de la igualdad

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