Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs

Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment

“…4 Second, bids of l can be interpreted as not bidding; therefore, the assumption enhances model realism. Finally, similar action spaces have appeared in other auction models (McAdams, 2007;Cao and Tian, 2010).…”

Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs

“…One is search auction, denoted by A s , where a seller incurs costs to attract bidders to the auction (Crémer, et al 2007;Szech, 2011;Li and Xu, 2016). The other is auctions with costly entry, where bidders need to pay entry costs to participate in the auction, which can be further summarized to two branches: in the …rst branch, denoted by A u , bidders make entry decisions before knowing their true valuations of the product (McAfee and McMillan, 1987;Levin and Smith, 1994) (Samuelson, 1985;Tan and Yilankaya, 2006;Cao and Tian, 2010).…”

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective

“…The FPA environment with costly entry has been examined by Cao and Tian (2010) with two groups of bidders: "weak" and "strong". As before, the value distribution of "strong" bidders first order stochastically dominates the one of "weak" players.…”