Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information

Leininger, Wolfgang; Linhart, Peter B.; Radner, Roy

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8

Cited by 121 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…It turns out that s(|, v s )=(1Âm(|))(1Â4+2v s Â3) and b(|, v b )= (1Âm(|))(1Â12+2v b Â3) is an equilibrium, which Chatterjee and Samuelson [7] call the``linear equilibrium''. A great variety of equilibria exist, including equilibria in which strategies are solutions to differential equations (Satterthwaite and Williams [31]) as well as equilibria in which strategies are discontinuous (Leininger, Linhart, and Radner [17]). The linear equilibrium, however, among all equilibria, maximizes total expected gains from trade.…”

Section: When Money Is Common Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs

Chwe

1999

Journal of Economic Theory

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Section: When Money Is Common Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs

Chwe

1999

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…Leininger, Linhart, and Radner (1986) and Satterthwaite and Williams (1987) explore some of these alternative equilibria, and we use one in our model when it is not possible to use the Chatterjee-Samuelson equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cheap talk can matter in bargaining

Farrell

Gibbons

1989

Journal of Economic Theory

221

130

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“…23 See Figure 4. Calculating 21 Of course, the values obtained only coincide approximately. However, as we argue below, we believe that the true values indeed are the same.…”

Section: Welfare Analysismentioning

confidence: 98%

Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

Jarque

Ponsatı́

Sákovics

2003

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer.An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

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Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information

Cited by 121 publications

References 11 publications

The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs

The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs

Cheap talk can matter in bargaining

Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

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