Equilibrium among local jurisdictions: toward an integrated treatment of voting and residential choice

Epple, Dennis; Filimon, Radu; Römer, Thomas

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90012-4

Cited by 242 publications

(160 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…However, if preferred expenditure and home value were negatively correlated, NYSTAR will tend to exacerbate these differences in preferences. Though the empirical evidence is mixed (see, for example, Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982), home value and spending preferences are typically assumed to be positively correlated in theoretical models of local public finance (e.g., Epple et al, 1984;Calabrese et al, 2008). However, whether progressive fiscal incentives lead to larger changes in district spending is an empirical question.…”

Section: Did the Impact Of Nystar Vary With The Distribution Of Tax Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

Local response to fiscal incentives in heterogeneous communities

Rockoff¹

2010

Journal of Urban Economics

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Section: Did the Impact Of Nystar Vary With The Distribution Of Tax Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

Local response to fiscal incentives in heterogeneous communities

Rockoff¹

2010

Journal of Urban Economics

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“…In multi-community models with migration costs, we get the well-known strati…cation result, going back to Tiebout (1956). Citizens with similar preferences for taxes and government spending or public good provision group together in one jurisdiction (see, e.g., Epple and Romer, 1991, Epple, Filimon, and Romer, 1984, Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996, Glomm and Laguno¤, 1998, Hansen and Kessler 2001b, or Nechyba, 1997. Implicitly, 2 An exception is Hindricks (2001) who analyzes the case where the poor are more mobile.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…8 Its mean is given by = R "g(")d". We do not have to specify variance and skewness of g("), as we have the same distribution for each income group of citizens.…”

Section: Voting On the Welfare State: Migrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Migration and the welfare state: The economic power of the non-voter?

Boerner¹,

Uebelmesser²

2007

Int Tax Public Finan

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This paper investigates the impact of emigration on the political choice regarding the size of the welfare state. Mobility has two countervailing e¤ects: the political participation e¤ect and the tax base e¤ect. With emigration, the composition of the constituency changes. This increases the political in ‡uence of the less mobile part of the population. The new political majority has to take into account that emigration reduces tax revenues and thereby a¤ects the feasible set of redistribution policies. The interaction of the two e¤ects has so far not been analyzed in isolation. We …nd that the direction of the total e¤ect of migration depends on the initial income distribution in the economy. Our results also contribute to the empirical debate on the validity of the median-voter approach for explaining the relation between income inequality and redistribution levels.JEL Classi…cation: F22, H50, D31, D72

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“…5 The longer-run impact was to create a system of "grand-fathered" tax rates for houses based on historical prices. The associated tax savings can be substantial: Considering the one quarter of San Francisco Bay Area families with more than 20 years of housing tenure in 1 Much of the intuition on household sorting was derived from a long line of theoretical work in local public finance that started in Tiebout (1956), and which includes Epple and Zelenitz (1981), Epple, Filimon, andRomer (1984, 1993), Benabou (1993), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), Nechyba (1997) and Epple and Sieg (1999). 2 Recent examples are found in Barrow and Rouse (2004), Rothstein (2006) and Bajari and Kahn (2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

You Can Take It with You: Transferability of Proposition 13 Tax Benefits, Residential Mobility, and Willingness to Pay for Housing Amenities

Ferreira

2004

SSRN Journal

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The endogeneity of prices has long been recognized as the main identification problem in the estimation of marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the characteristics of a given product. This issue is particularly important in the housing market, since a number of housing and neighborhood features are unobserved by the econometrician. This paper proposes the use of a well defined type of transaction costs-moving costs generated by property tax laws-to deal with this type of omitted variable bias. California's Proposition 13 property tax law is the source of variation in transaction costs used in the empirical analysis. Beyond its fiscal consequences, Proposition 13 created a lock-in effect on housing choice because of the implicit tax break enjoyed by homeowners living in the same house for a long time. Its importance to homeowners is estimated from a natural experiment created by two amendments that allow households headed by an individual over the age of 55 to transfer the implicit tax benefit to a new home. Indeed, 55-year old homeowners have 25% higher moving rates than those of comparable 54 year olds. These transaction costs from the property tax laws are then incorporated into a household sorting model. The key insight is that because of the property tax laws, different potential buyers may have different user costs for the same house. The exogenous property tax component of this user cost is then used as an instrumental variable. I find that MWTP estimates for housing characteristics are approximately 100% upward biased when the choice model does not account for the price endogeneity. KeywordsHousing demand, transaction costs, household behaviour Disciplines Economics | Other Social and Behavioral Sciences | Real Estate | TaxationThis journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers/70Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1427832The research program of the Center for Economic Studies (CES) produces a wide range of theoretical and empirical economic analyses that serve to improve the statistical programs of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Many of these analyses take the form of CES research papers. The papers are intended to make the results of CES research available to economists and other interested parties in order to encourage discussion and obtain suggestions for revision before publication. The papers are unofficial and have not undergone the review accorded official Census Bureau publications.The opinions and conclusions expressed in the papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Republication in whole or part must be cleared with the authors. All papers are screened to ensure that they do not disclose confidential information. Persons who wish to obtain a copy of the paper, submit comments about the paper, or obtain general information about the series should contact Sang V. Nguyen, Editor, Discussion Papers, Center for Economic Studies, Bureau of the Census, 4600 Si...

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Equilibrium among local jurisdictions: toward an integrated treatment of voting and residential choice

Cited by 242 publications

References 6 publications

Local response to fiscal incentives in heterogeneous communities

Local response to fiscal incentives in heterogeneous communities

Migration and the welfare state: The economic power of the non-voter?

You Can Take It with You: Transferability of Proposition 13 Tax Benefits, Residential Mobility, and Willingness to Pay for Housing Amenities

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