2011
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.1111.3933
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Equilibrium and Potential in Coalitional Congestion Games

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“…• Surplus collaboration: Given a social network, players seek to maximize the average payoff for themselves and their friends. This requirement is similar in spirit to coalitional congestion games (Hayrapetyan, Tardos, and Wexler 2006;Kuniavsky and Smorodinsky 2011). Hoefer et al (2011) also consider players being embedded in a social network and assume that certain constraints specify which sets of coalitions may jointly deviate from their actual strategies in the game.…”
Section: Social Context Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…• Surplus collaboration: Given a social network, players seek to maximize the average payoff for themselves and their friends. This requirement is similar in spirit to coalitional congestion games (Hayrapetyan, Tardos, and Wexler 2006;Kuniavsky and Smorodinsky 2011). Hoefer et al (2011) also consider players being embedded in a social network and assume that certain constraints specify which sets of coalitions may jointly deviate from their actual strategies in the game.…”
Section: Social Context Gamesmentioning
confidence: 99%