Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification

Identification of Individual Demands from Market Data under Uncertainty

“…We study whether unobserved variables can be uniquely determined (identified) from the observed subset of the manifold. 4 Since, under assumptions 2 and 1, equilibrium exists for every profile of preferences and endowments, our observational assumption is not vacuous.…”

“…In this case, our analysis still holds under the following assumption: for every s and every sequence (x n ) ∞ n=1 defined in R L ++ , if it converges to some x in ∂R L + , then it is true that ||Du i s (x n )|| −1 Du i s (x n ) · x n → 0 and ||Du i s (x n )|| −1 → ∞. 4 So our question is one of identification and not one of testability or refutability, which has been dealt with elsewhere: for the standard Arrow-Debreu model, see Brown and Matzkin (1996); for the case of uncertainty, see Kübler (2003). For a survey of this literature, see Carvajal et al (2004).…”

“…4 So our question is one of identification and not one of testability or refutability, which has been dealt with elsewhere: for the standard Arrow-Debreu model, see Brown and Matzkin (1996); for the case of uncertainty, see Kübler (2003). For a survey of this literature, see Carvajal et al (2004). 5 The argument of the function and its derivatives is omitted in the expression; the condition is to hold at every (p, w) ∈ {p ∈ R N ++ |p 0,1 = 1} × R N ++ .…”

Identification of Preferences from Market Data

“…In Balasko's argument, behavior at null endowments is used, unlike here. In Chiappori et al the assumption of the observation of a relatively open subset of the equilibrium manifold implies that the aggregate endowment is allowed to vary as well: their argument allows for perturbations to each agent's endowments, keeping prices and the endowments of other consumers fixed (see Carvajal et al, 2004).…”

Is There a Walrasian Equilibrium in Exchange Markets with Endowment Effect

“…Building on Afriat (1967) they derive testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold 1 introduced by Balasko (1975). Various extensions of the Brown and Matzkin framework have been developed by Kubler (2003) for expected utility, Snyder (1999) for public goods and Carvajal (2004) for random preferences [see also Carvajal, Ray andSnyder (2004), or Chiappori et al (2004)]. …”